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#1
10-23-2006, 07:45 PM
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USS Liberty Murders by Israel:Doctored Gun Camera Photos
The Judge made a reference in another threadstating that if he would be willing to agree the USS Liberty attack of June 8, 1967 was murder...
..in exchange for the matter being dropped. The USS Liberty murders by Israel are a starting point for consideration of the WTC 9/11 attacks I state I'd rather he comment on whether Israel had engaged in DOCTORING of two Gun Camera photos... ..the first being contained in Israel's own IDF History Report of 1982... There is no mast on this vessel... there is no portion of the superstructure/wheelhouse that would normally be obscured by a nontransparent mast.... If you stand St. Louis offensive lineman, Orlando Pace in front of a Pepsi Machine and take a snapshot...you will not be able to see the Pepsi Machine. There is no way the entire superstructure should be unobscured, Judge http://usslibertyinquiry.com/essays/guncameraparts.html Now, Judge...on to the second photo provided to Federal Judge, A. Jay Cristol(P. 79 of THE LIBERTY INCIDENT) and Thames Television(London, UK) These two photos were taken moments apart, Judge...notice the starry "gun sight reticule" superimposed on the doctored photo.... http://usslibertyinquiry.com/essays/...racristol.html Also, Judge...both photos a re designed to fool the reader into thinking they're "negatives"... No! They were intentionally blurred and the CONTRAST set to "maximum"...there is no valid photograhic reason to do so That is not a ship being attacked in the Eastern Mediterranean, Judge.. Look at the tension cable extending from the tugboat wheelhouse to the fantail...it is visble in both photos from the second hyperlink Also, the doctored photo must have a tugboat shaped sea serpent, Judge...the attacking Mirage Fighters...and their cameras ... ...were not on the scene when the attacking Motor Torpedo Boats arrived. TREATMENT OF THE CIA DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT BY FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY JUDGE, A. JAY CRISTOL Here is the statement of the CIA Director at the time of the attack followed by A. Jay Cristol's deceptive spin. http://www.cappersmall.com/forums/sh...06&postcount=1 The CIA Director stated there WAS a CIA Board of Inquiry convened and IT WAS possessed of a "finding" that Israel knew they were attacking Americans.... It was not his opinion that a CIA Board of Inquiry was convened. Cristol's shills have been unable to produce the page number in his book or hyperlink to any public appearances where Helms stated th opinions in his book were not the official position of the CIA. http://thelibertyincident.com/walsh-response.html Quote:
Cristol mentions the CIA Board of Inquiry..but only to repeat Helms was not involved in a report submitted to him by subordinates...where does Cristol deal with the finding of "foreknowledge"? Cristol lied...he is intentionally deceptive in discussing the murder of his fellow Americans, Judge One does not need to lie nor doctor evidence if they are truly innocent, Judge You see for yourself that the evil of Trossi, JonnyBlaze, Keith and DadAph extends also to people in high positions in our government, Judge Let's move the discsussion along to the WTC attacks now...since you've offered, let's validate the letterbox proposed statement as a stipulation in future PM discussions Quote:
Extend the offer to Keith, Trossi and DadAph to hyperlink you to where they've substantively...not sarcastically...addressed important points like these... If they refuse, Judge...then I'd ask that the Forum Moderation stipulate to the contents of the letterbox for purposes of future discussion on the CM PM. Thank you 
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#2
10-23-2006, 07:59 PM
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Enough Is Enough With Your Nonsense !!
Psycho USS Liberty Conspiratorial Slanders
Most conspiracies hang together by a belabored psycho-social paranoid analysis. The conspiracy theory that Israel's attack on the USS Liberty in 1967 was "intentional" is a slanderous fabrication. There are always those who will believe these conspiracy theories because they want to, because they have prejudices which make them vulnerable to these false allegations and no amount of logic or denial will ever convince them otherwise. This essay is not for them. This lie about Israel being intentionaly culpable for the death of Americans is nothing less than a continued slander of a whole people. The U.S. Liberty was on an intelligence gathering mission and James Ennis, who wrote the book that damned Israel for the attack was also a crypto officer on the U.S.S. Liberty. That doesn't however, place him in a better position to know what was _intended_ by the Israelis. That kind of intelligence was not available electronicly, but only through reconstructing the events that preceeded the attack. And, members of the crew who were quoted in Ennis' book had their perceptions reinforced by their position as players in this tragic drama. Their positions were emotional and reactionary. The attack on the USS Liberty was tragic, but the Liberty was mistakenly identified as an Egyptian supply vessel. The Liberty and the El-Quesir resembled each other. They had a similar deck line. the bridge structure was in mid-ship for both of them. A single smokestack was in mid-ship. The Liberty's antennae on the aft and fore decks resembled El-Quseir's masts. The antennae on the Liberty's fore deck also resembled a gun. There are three parts here with sufficient details to refute any false claims that the attack on the USS Liberty was malicious. The attack was the unintended result of the heat of battle and a tragic mistake. There is first of all here, a description of the event as published in "The Boats of Cherbourg" (pg 68-69) 1988, by Abraham Rabinovich, a senior feature writer for the Jerusalem Post, and a foreign correspondent. There are then several other quotes which follow this one. Then there is my evaluation and following that are several addendums, which include other analysis and some recent disclosures. "Unknown to the Israelis, the vessel had sailed into the war zone on June 8, the fourth day of the war, to monitor battlefield communications. On that day, naval headquarters in Haifa ordered three torpedo boats to sail from Ashdod harbor to check reports that El Arish, captured by the army three days before was being shelled from the sea. The explosions and smoke in El Arish had in fact been caused by an Egyptian ammunition dump that detonated. However, as the torpedo boats approached the area, their radar picked up a target to the west, moving away from El Arish. Presuming it to be an Egyptian warship, naval headquarters called for an air strike to slow up the seemingly fleeing vessel." "Two Mirages were directed to the area, and the lead pilot reported 'seeing no flag'. The ship had two guns on the forecastle and was clearly not Israeli. Liberty crewmen would firmly maintain afterward that the American flag was being flown, but the Mirage pilot's report was taken at navy headquarters as confirmation that the ship was an Egyptian vessel trying to reach Port Said. Ordered to attack, the planes set the vessel afire with strafing runs. The smoke thickened when another plane dispatched to the scene dropped a napalm bomb on the Liberty's deck." From an article in The Jerusalem Report (November 1991), by Hirsh Goodman, "Yes, there was doubt as to the identify of the ship. One of the pilots identified it as a Russian vessel during the course of the attack, bringing the cabinet into emergency session. This fear was quickly dispelled. And yes, there still remains controversy about whether or not there was an American flag visible at the time of the attack. But while some mystery remains, the truth is now basically known: The incident was a tragic mistake marked by serious errors of judgement on both sides, complicated by the fog and urgency of war and compounded by an almost childish rivalry between the air force and the navy as to who would grab the prize: sinking what was genuinely thought to be an Egyptian ship shelling Israeli forces at El Arish from the sea." Goodman goes on to write: "Mistakes are not uncommon in war. The day before the Liberty was attacked, Israeli warplanes bombed and strafed an Israeli armored column near Jenin in the West Bank. During the Lebanese war, in June 1982, over 20 Israeli servicemen were killed when a Phantom jet pilot mistakenly identified Israeli tanks as Syrian. In May 1987, in the Gulf, the USS Stark was accidentally hit by Iraqi warplanes, killing 37 servicemen. An Iranian civilian airliner was shot down by an over-anxious American battleship crew in May 1988, killing all 290 passengers on board. So it was with the Liberty, an American spy ship, that should not have been where it was, when it was." Goodman says, "there are many open questions: Why a message from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS message 072230Z) directing the ship to remain at least 20 miles off the Egyptian coast was delayed for 14 hours and why, when it was finally transmitted, it was sent in error to the Naval Communication Center in the Philippines. Why a second crucial message from the Joint Chiefs drafted at 2.00 a.m. on the morning of June 8, exactly 12 hours before the ship was attacked, ordering the Liberty to steam at least 100 miles from the coast was lost as well." He says had the message (080917) "been received, there would have been no Liberty incident." James M. Ennes, Jr, was the crypto specialist and Deck Officer of the USS Liberty wrote an article for Electronics Defense Magazine in 1981. The title of his article was: " Israeli Attack on U.S. Ship Reveals Failure of C3" in which he says: The United States made several serious, almost frantic attempts to move the ship. As the Liberty approached Gaza, the Joint Chiefs of Staff first sent a priority message ordering the ship to move 20 miles from the coast; the message was swamped by higher precedence traffic and was not processed until long after the crisis had ended. Hours later, a JCS. duty officer phoned naval headquarters in London to relay an urgent JCS order to move the ship 100 miles from the coast; the telephone call was ignored, and Liberty's copy of the confirming message was misrouted to the Philipines before being returned to the Pentagon, where it was again misrouted, this time to Fort Meade in Maryland, where it was lost." By the way, I have also been a crypto specialist at JCS (early 60s) and I'm familiar with their procedures and on the job difficulties - which occasionally result in errors and mistakes. In that article he goes on to say, "Eventually, at least six critical messages were lost, delayed, or otherwise mishandled. Any one of those messages might have saved Liberty. None reached the ship." Rabinovich writes: "The son of Admiral Erell, Udi was an ensign aboard one of the torpedo boats. He could see the smoke from a long distance as the boats raced at top speed toward the scene. As the vessel came into view, Erell's skipper scanned an identification book containing pictures of the ships in the Arab fleets and consulted with the commanders on the other boats. The squadron commander concluded that the ship was the Egyptian supply vessel el Quseir. Ensign Erell, looking over his skipper's shoulder at the picture and glancing up at the burning vessel, fully agreed, even though he would later recall that the mast in the picture was not positioned identically with the mast of the target vessel...." "Nevertheless, the squadron commander sought to confirm the vessel's identity before attacking. When the Israeli signalman flashed the message "What ship?" Udi Erell saw the response flickering through the smoke four miles away---"AAA", the signal meaning "Identify yourself first." The same signal had been flashed, the Israelis were aware, by the Egyuptian destroyer challenged off Haifa during the Sinai Campaign in 1956. Americans on the bridge of the Liberty would later state that the signals flashed were the ship's name and its international call sign, not what the Israelis believed they saw. Even with binoculars, Erell could make out *no flag*. The sqaudron commander ordered his boats to commence torpedo attacks. The vessels peeled off to make their runs and fired five torpedos. Only one hit home. The boats raked the burning ship, now dead in the water, with their guns." "Fire was halted when one of the officers reported seeing the identification markings CTR-5 on the ship's hull, markings that were not those of an Arab vessel. Notified of this, Haifa ordered the sqaudron commander to pick up survivors and definitely establish the ship's identity......Drawing closer to the burning vessel, they were able to make out a flag. It was not opened by a breeze and could not immediately be identified, but it was clearly not Egyptian...." "Udi saw a splash of red on the flag and heard a report being sent back to Haifa that the vessel might be Russian. The report caused shock and consternation when passed on to General Staff headquarters. The shock was not abated when the torpedo-spadron commander reported half an hour later that he had identified the vessel as American." Mitchell G. Bard and Joel Himelbarb in "Myths and Facts: A Concise Record of the Arab-Israeli Conflict" write: "None of Israel's accusers has been able to explain adequately why Israel would have deliberately attacked an American ship. Confusion in a long line of communications, which occurred in a tense atmosphere on both the American and Israeli sides (a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the ship to remain at least 20 miles off the Egyptian coast never arrived) is a more probable explanation." [Unless you wish to accept one of the conspiracy theories that suggests that Israel attacked the Liberty because the U.S. was passing strategic intelligence information to the Arabs. Some actually believe that, but conspiracists will grab at anything to make their argument seem more credible.] They write: "Accidents caused by "friendly fire" are not uncommon in wartime. In 1988, the U.S. Navy mistakenly downed an Iranian passenger plane, killing 290 civilians. During the Gulf War, 35 of the 148 Americans who died in battle were killed by "friendly fire." In fact, only the day before the Liberty was attacked, Israeli pilots accidentally bombed one of their own armored columns south of Jenin on the West Bank." As a former high-ranking Israeli naval officer, Shlomo Erell, told the Associated Press (June 5, 1977): "No one would ever have dreamt that an American ship would be there. Even the United States didn't know where its ship was. We were advised by the proper authorities that there was no American ship within 100 miles." Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told Congress on July 26, 1967: "It was the conclusion of the investigatory body, headed by an admiral of the navy in whom we have great confidence, that the attack was not intentional." USS Liberty Slanders (2) Israel did of course apologize for the tragedy and paid millions of dollars in reparations to the United States and to the families of the victims. Several claims have been made after Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote that there was a key witness in Dwight Porter, the U.S. ambassador to Beirut in June of "67", who according to Evans and Novak saw a transcript of a conversation, intercepted by his embassy, in which an Israeli pilot told his controller that the Liberty was an American vessel and received orders to attack. This is a fabrication. The National Security Agency tapes just released (in 2003) also confirm that the pilot did not identify the ship. Evans and Novak wrote that Porter admitted that he destroyed the intercept immediately after he read it. The truth is it could hardly have been a transcript of a radio conversation intercepted by the embassy in Beirut, because the pilots used short range [UHF] ultra-high frequencies. These signals are only good for short distances and could NOT have been intercepted in the Lebanese capital, which was 205 miles away but intercepts would be possible at closer range or from spy planes - and NSA did have intercepts which were recorded by U.S. spy planes. The recording clearly shows that the pilots were confused and did not identify the ship as American. In any case Porter's recollection which was different from the actual tape and the technical impossibility of interception over 200 miles away completely discredited the so-called Evans and Novak witness. The new evidence released under the "Freedom of Information Act" were from taped intercepts by NSA of conversations held from two Israeli Air Force helicopter pilots who were hovering over the Liberty as it was sinking, which confirms Israel's claim that the sinking of the ship, which killed 34 American servicemen and wounded 171, was a tragic error. "An American spy plane, which had been sent to the area as soon as the NSA learned of the attack, recorded their conversations..." (Nathan Guttman, Haaretz Correspondent) Evans and Novak also claimed a second witness. Ennes has also eluded to that witness in some correspondance he has had with me. The witness is a "Major" Seth Mintz, the so-called "mystery man," the inside witness in the Israeli War Room. It turns out that the major wasn't a major at all, but a sargeant, who was a truck driver in the Israeli army, who was unlikely to have ever been in the War Room at all. He simply didn't have a "need-to-know" or occupational speciality which would require it his presense. When queried by Evans and Novak, Mintz told them that General Danny Matt brought him into the War Room. This is another invention for the purpose of framing the Israelis. Danny Matt wasn't a General at all. Matt was a colonel who wasn't even there. He who commanded paratroopers in the Rafah sector at the time of the attack so that story doesn't hold up either. And Mintz was an American-born Israeli who moved to Maine. He kept changing his story. When proven wrong, his story changed and he said it was now his "friend and mentor" General Benni Matti, who was with him at the time of the incident in the War Room. However, there never has been anyone by that name in the Israeli army. After the so-called scoop by Evans and Novak (who always finds every excuse to try to nail the Israelis - which he has never done successfully), Mintz told reporters that what he said was "distorted into a lie" but it turns out that Mintz was less than credible with other stories. Rex Bloomstein, a British award-winning film maker spent months researching the Liberty and discarded his interview with Mintz because of all the discrepancies and said the man "was less than convincing." It appears that Mintz was nothing less than a glory hound who was looking for some kind of recognition. Whatever motivates someone like this is not within the purview of this article to make that kind of analysis. "Errors and No Facts" It is sufficient to say that Evans and Novak made many other material mistakes in their "scoop". They claimed missiles were used, and that this was the worst disaster in military history. Hardly, but it is not for nothing that Evans and Novak have often been referred to as "Errors and No Facts" by other investigative journalists. None of those claiming Israel's complicity in a conspiracy to murder Americans has been meticulous in their observance of truth and accuracy. It must be emphasized also that if the intent of the Israeli military was to destroy the Liberty, then the aircraft would have been appropriately armed with anti-ship ordnance. It wasn't. If it had been, there would not have been anything left of the USS Liberty. A major problem with Ennes and all the other excuses and attempts at shifting blame for the attack on the Liberty from the US Navy to the the IDF is a lack of accountability for the U.S "spy" ship being there in the first place. Deniability Without Accountability Ennes wants to continue to play the victim and anyone who suggests the Liberty may have been at fault for being in the wrong place at the wrong time is in his eyes analogous to being a rapist and a person who victimizes the victims. The circumstances were such that the Liberty was in the middle of a war and running contrary to orders, which they claim they never received. They were victims because they got caught up in something they should have been trained for and they continued to provoke hostilities when they fired on Israeli torpedo boats. And how many years did it take for the U.S. to finally release the NSA tapes exonerating the Israelis? The Liberty fiasco wasn't the first nor the last U.S. military screw-up. There been ample examples of deniability without accountability. The Liberty and the Navy needed their scapegoat and it was logical for them to blame the Israelis, rather than accept blame themselves for the appearance of being a hostile ship in a war zone...and faulting those who put them there.. or, those responsible for the communication's problems. Seems ironic that a communications vessel should have problems with their communications? The military's failure to fix blame for Air Force F-15 pilots shooting down Army Black Hawk helicopters, plunging 26 people to fiery deaths in Iraq, is an example of military "deniability." The case made for SOG forces in Laos killing defectors may be another instance of U.S. _coverup_ and military "deniability?." In the past quarter-century alone, there have been at least four _monstrous_ foul-ups, all of which cost lives. Yet no one in our military has been blamed for any of them. Tut-tut letters in someone's service record doesn't fix blame. There are too many "friendly fire" incidents and military mistakes to list all of them here. We know they're way too numerous. We know when it happens to Israel and there are American victims it becomes a mission to blame the Israelis. Recall that a sailor was shot to death and the nation was disgraced in 1968, when North Korea captured the spy ship USS Pueblo and its 83-man Navy crew. Recall that 241 Marines and sailors were killed in 1983 when a lone terrorist drove through their lines at the Beirut International Airport and detonated his load of explosives. Recall that the USS Vincennes mistakeningly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner in 1988, killing 290 civilians and inspiring the sabotage of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing another 270 people. Recall when two F-15 fighter planes shot down in broad daylight two Army Black Hawks in the mistaken belief they were Soviet Hind helicopters, which would have posed no great threat to the highly maneuverable F-15s. What happened? Who was blamed? Where was the accountability? The Air Force ended up putting only one officer in the dock, Air Force Capt. James Wang, and he was acquitted. The families of those victims are suffering a lack of 'accountability' by the Air Force, just as the families of the victims of the Liberty are suffering the lack of accountability by the U.S. Navy. The difficulty in fixing blame is that everyone is to some extent responsible; therefore no one person could fairly be held responsible. So everybody gets off. But, there appeared to be a need for a patsy and with the Liberty, it is Israel who became the scapegoat. James Ennes accuses Rabin of being a "liar." If Rabin was a liar, so is everyone else who has ever written about Rabin's breakdown. But, he says it is all Israeli propaganda...and we should listen to his "propaganda" and whatever "white paper" was issued by a congressional committee doing an investigation for an incident for which they had to come up with "deniability." The revisionists blame the U.S.S. Liberty and the war on Israeli propaganda that. It doesn't matter to the anti-Zionists that Israel was threatened with annihilation. Never the mind that for Israel and the Jews, the wars against the Jewish state has always been a matter of life and death. Never mind the threat was to bring about an annulment of Israel's existence and there have been repeated threats and actions against Israel from across and within all of its borders. "We swear to God that we shall not rest until we restore the Arab nation to Palestine and Palestine to the Arab nation. There is no room for imperialism and there is no room for Israel within the Arab nation."On June 7th [my birthday, so I remember it well], it was the third day of the war and the Israeli naval command was under-equipped to defend Israel's shores and dependent on the air force and human observation for long range early warning. It would be an understatement to say, the Navy was fearful and frustrated. because of the tension after the loss of an elite frogman commando unit, which was captured by the Egyptians, and the sightings of three Egyptian submarines close to the Israeli shore. There was also a report of several Soviet vessels in the area. An Israeli Nord aircraft took off from an airfield early on the morning of the 8th with an Israeli navy spotter on board to patrol the shore and insure that enemy vessels did not penetrate Israeli waters during the night before. Israel had to have a human spotter for early warning because Israel in 1967 had very limited radar capability. Almost two hours after the aircraft started its patrol, it notified the duty officer in the navy war room that a ship had been spotted West of Gaza. It appeared to be a destroyer from the air. The officer ordered a red marker placed on the battle control table. Red was the color used to indicate an "unidentified" ship. Almost 20 minutes later the Nord sent another report in which the spotter identified the ship as an "American naval-supply vessel. The ship was identified by the spotter and would have then been considered neutral, but the marker was not changed from red to green, to designate a neutral vessel. The Israelis admitted this. They did not deny it. he reason given by the duty officer at a board of inquiry was the "identification had been vague and uncertain." And, then from 6 to 9 a.m. the navy's attention in the war room was diverted to an emergency, with the penetration of an enemy submarine west of the town of Atlit, where a huge oil slick had been sighted. At 8:50 the navy dispatched the destroyer MV Haifa to the area. The Haifa detonated five depth charges at 9:02 without success. While the hunt for the enemy sub was ongoing, Admiral Erell entered the underground war room to take personal command and he questioned the duty officer about the red marker west of the Sinai coast. Told that the marker designated what was thought to be an American supply ship, he ordered the marker changed to green and he concentrated on the submarine. More depth charges were detonated and air bubbles and oil was rising to the surface. At the same time, the war room received a cable from an Israel pilot reporting that he was being shot at by an "unidentified" ship off the Sinai coast. After he landed and in debriefing he said that he was not fired at, but he had seen a ship and it appeared to be "gray" and "wider than usual, and with a bridge in the middle." The information was filed and forgotten. Then, after 10 a.m. the Nord aircraft returned and in debriefing the navy spotter reported that he had clearly seen a GTR-5 on the side of the vessel. Major Pinchasi at the naval operations room at Naval Headquarters consulted Jane's Fighting Ships and identified the ship as an American intelligence vessel named the "Liberty." At 11 a.m. the duty commanders in the navy war room changed shifts and a Lt. Col took over temporary command. He ordered the green marker removed from the battle control table so it would not be cluttered. Standard naval operating procedure dictated that battle control table should be kept as simple as possible, but in retrospect, it was a fatal decision for the Liberty because from 11:05 on the Liberty was no longer a known quantity for those who were operationally responsible for conducting a fast-moving, three-front, war, who were feeling the heat of battle decision making. At 11:24 the air force reported to the naval chief of operation, Col Issy Rehav, that the Sinai coast city of El Arish, captured by Israeli forces the day before was being shelled from the sea. And, at 11:27 a.m., a second, independent report ame in, and this time from Southern Command Hqts, that El Arish was indeed being bombarded from the sea. In his book, Ennis also reported explosions in El Arish. The smoke and explosions were clearly visible to the crew of the Liberty, which is how close they were to what was presumed to be an enemy attack on the coastal city. Later it was determined that an Egyptian ammo depot had exploded in El Arish. The Israeli general command assumed that the city was under attack from the sea and the Liberty just happened to be there, which made it look an awful lot like the Liberty had been doing the shelling. Col Rehav at 12:05 p.m. ordered three torpedo boats from the 914 Squadron to leave Ashdod and proceed towards El Arish and at 12:15 captain of the flagship torpedo boat, Lt. Col Moshe Oren was ordered to sail to 20 miles north of El Arish and patrol that area. At 1:07 p.m. he was instructed to call for an air strike upon spotting the target. At 1:41, 2nd Lt Aharon Yfrach, the radar operator about the flagship, T-204, picked up a target on his scope. The ship was spotted at 20 nautical miles northwest of El Arish, 14 miles off the Bardawil shore, and moving west at a speed of about thirty knots. Standard operating procedure for the Israeli navy in 1967 was that any ship moving faster than 20 knots in a battle arena was to be presumed hostile. A second radar check indicated the target's speed at 28 knots. The Israelis later said the reading was inaccurate, which can be attributed to what is known as "radar jump" or simply an erroneous reading by the radar operator? The radar on torpedo boats were often inaccurate. The conclusions at the time however was, it was moving at faster than 20 knots and the target in question was probably a warship. It also 'appeared to be sailing an evasive course' in the direction of Port Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal, which would also indicate it was hostile. At 1:45 p.m. it was decided by Rehav to order an attack on the ship. It would take awhile for the torpedo boats to get there so an air strike was called. Senior air force battle controller, Lt Col Shmuel Kislev, ordered two Mirage III C fighters on their way back to Israel from an air patrol over the Suez Canal to divert to the target. The Mirages reached the target at about 2 p.m. The lead plane dropped to an altitude of 3,000 feet and circled the target twice. The second aircraft circled the target only once. It was reported that the ship was NOT Israeli, it was painted battle-gray and had two cannons in the forecastle, a mast in the front and one funnel. In a Battle Arena Major General Mordechai Hod, the commander of the Israeli air force, asked the pilot by radio if any flag was visible. The pilot reported back "I see no flag or other signs of identification." Members of the crew find this a major point of contention, but regardless of that fact, there must be accountability for being in a battle arena, and assessments are made by the air force command, based on the pilot's observation, the course of the ship, the reported speed and the evasive running of the ship, location, etc., and the impression was that it was a hostile ship. At 2:06, the pilots began their straffing runs and straffed the U.S.S. Liberty four times. Fire had broken out on the left side of the ship. Two more aircraft were diverted, this time Super Mystere jets en route to a bombing mission over the Mitla Pass in the Central Sinai. The were carrying napalm bombs, which are not suitable for attacking targets at sea but it was decided to use the aircraft anyway. The Mysteres made two bombing runs, but only one bomb hit the ship. As there was no return fire from the Liberty, the lack of a response was puzzling and the lead pilot flew low enough to notice a P-30 painted on the hull. He then dropped to only ninety feet above the water line and this time noticed CTR-5 on the hull. He said he saw no flag. He was told to report on damages and leave the target area. At 2:15 the air force controller in central operation dispatched two helicopters to the area to pick up survivors. Meanwhile the torpedo boats had arrived at the scene. The flagship flahed the message, "What ship?" But, the U.S.S. Liberty replied "AA" meaning "Identify yourselves first." That was really dumb. Here they are listing, enveloped in smoke, heavily damaged and their captain is telling the torpedo boats to identify themselves first? Eleven years before, during the Sinai campaign, exactly the same exchange had taken place between an Israeli destroyer, the MV Yaffo, and an Egyptian ship, the Ibrahim-el-Awwal. Oren, who was a young offer on the Yaffo's bridge at the time, remembered the incident well. If he had any doubts that the burning vessel ahead of him was Egyptian, they were now dispelled. While he was deciding whether to attack, a burst of machine gun fire erupted from the ship's forecastle. It seems that a seaman apprentice on board did not hear the Captain's "hold-your- fire order" and fired several volleys at the torpedo boats. Oren still hestitated until he consulted the Israeli navy's book identifying the ships of the Arab navies and concluded that the ship in question was the Egyptian suppply vessel EL QUSEIR. One of the other captains of another torpedo boat came up with the same identification. And, at 2:37 Lt Col Oren gave the order to attack the ship. This was after being fired upon from the Liberty. At 2:43 advancing with rapid cannon fire, the topedo boats fired torpedos. At least one torpedo hit the ship. When the T-204 crossed the ship's bow, one of the officers aboard noticed the letters GTR on the hull of the ship and Oren immediately issued the hold-fire order. It was 2:47. No Cooperation No Help Wanted At 2:51, Oren radioed back to command headquarters that the ship could be Russian. Rabin called an emergency meeting of his adviser to discuss the possiblity of large sacale Soviet intervention but at 3:20 Oren notified headquarters that the ship was not Russian, it was American. At 3:30 the news was conveyed to Commander Castle, naval atache in Tel Aviv. Israel offered to help with the wounded. The offer was rejected. One must remember when Marines were wounded in Lebanon Israel offered then also to treat the wounded and that offer was then also rejected - causing additional loss of life. There must be "accountability" for that blunder also. The attack on the U.S.S. Liberty was not done with malice, but was a genuine understandable mistake, like many which are often made in battle, and which could have been avoided if the Liberty had stayed out of harm's way [as we learned later was the intention of the State Department and the Chiefs of Staff]. The problem is a lack of accountability. Take the case of the old cargo ship off North Korea sent to spy. Who sent the Peoblo? It was the skipper who the Court of Inquiry wanted to blame it on. It wasn't the skipper's fault. And, who recommended the sending in of Marines into the middle of the Lebanese civil war with no clearer mission than to establish a "presence?" It wasn't the Marine Corp, it was President Reagan, and his advisers. And, to his credit, Reagan did take responsibility for the airport bombing. Adm. William J. Crewe, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the world it was all Iran's fault that the Vincennes shot down the airliner, but failed to mention the ship was in Iranian waters at the time. Deniability, yes; but, what about U.S. Naval "accountability?" USS Liberty Slanders (3) Myths and Facts Mitchell Bard and Joel HimelbarbThe Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was a tragic mistake. But it must be recalled that the incident occurred in the midst of a full- scale war. On June 8, 1967, the third day of the conflict, the Israeli military command believed an Egyptian vessel had fired on Israeli positions in El Arish. It turned out to be the USS Liberty, an American intelligence ship assigned to monitor the fighting, which was 14 miles off the Sinai coast. Israeli war planes attacked, killing 34 members of the Liberty's crew and wounding 171. The Liberty was first reported-incorrectly, as it turned out-to be cruising at 22 knots, a rate usually maintained only by warships. The Liberty's flag, according to testimony of crew members, may not have been discernible because there was little wind, and the flag was knocked down after the first assault. Also, after the first attack, the Liberty's commander refused an Israeli request that the ship identify itself. And, according to testimony of its own crew, the Liberty bore at least a surface resemblance to the El Quseir, an Egyptian ship. The argument that the attack was a horrible error is further reinforced by a biography of Yitzhak Rabin (Dan Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin. NY: HarperCollins, 1998), who was Israel's Chief of Staff during the war, which says the Israelis initially were terrified that they had attacked a Soviet ship and might have provoked the Soviets to join the fighting. When they learned it was in fact a U.S. vessel, Rabin was still worried that the mistake might jeopardize American support for Israel. The misidentification of the Liberty as an enemy vessel was understandable. Three days earlier, Israel had asked that American ships be removed from its coast and that it be notified of the precise location of U.S. vessels. The Sixth Fleet was moved, but the Liberty did not get the message. In 1991, columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak trumpeted their discovery of an American who said he had been in the Israeli war room when the decision was made to knowingly attack the American ship.(3) In fact, that individual, Seth Mintz, was not in the war room at the time and the man who he said had been with him, a Gen. Benni Matti, did not exist. Also, contrary to their claim that an Israeli pilot identified the ship as American, the transcript of the radio traffic between the attack fighters and air force headquarters contains no such statement. None of Israel's accusers has been able to explain adequately why Israel would have deliberately attacked an American ship. Confusion in a long line of communications, which occurred in a tense atmosphere on both the American and Israeli sides (a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the ship to remain at least 20 miles off the Egyptian coast never arrived) is a more probable explanation. Accidents caused by "friendly fire" are common in wartime. In 1988, the U.S. Navy mistakenly downed an Iranian passenger plane, killing 290 civilians. During the Gulf War, 35 of the 148 Americans who died in battle were killed by "friendly fire." In fact, only the day before the Liberty was attacked, Israeli pilots accidentally bombed one of their own armored columns south of Jenin on the West Bank. As a former highranking Israeli naval officer, Shlomo Erell, told the Associated Press (June 5, 1977): "No one would ever have dreamt that an American ship would be there. Even the United States didn't know where its ship was. We were advised by the proper authorities that THERE WAS NO AMERICAN SHIP WITHIN 100 MILES." [EMPHASIS MINE] Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told Congress on July 26, 1967: "It was the conclusion of the investigatory body, headed by an admiral of the Navy in whom we have great confidence, that the attack was not intentional." In 1987, McNamara repeated his belief that the attack was an accident, telling a caller on the "Larry King Show" that he had seen nothing in the 20 years since to change his mind that there had been no "cover- up." Israel apologized for the tragedy and paid nearly $13 million in reparations to the United States and to the families of the victims. The last payment was received in December 1989, when the U.S. officially closed the books on the matter. Notes Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, CA: University of California Press, 1996, pp. 108-109. Rabin, p. 110. Washington Post, (November 6, 1991). Hirsh Goodman, "Messrs. Errors and No Facts," Jerusalem Report (November 21, 1991). Hirsh Goodman and Ze'ev Schiff, "The Attack on the Liberty," Atlantic Monthly, (September 1984). "The Larry King Show" (radio), (February 5, 1987). Addendum #1 (From Associated Press - provided here in compliance with the Fair Use Doctrine for education purposes)Addendum #2 Some of the survivors and some senior U.S. officials have said they believe the attack was deliberate, intentional and the objective was to stop American surveillance of Israel during the war. The tapes reveal that indeed the attack was unintentional and happened during the "fog of war." US Florida Judge Jay Cristol successfully petitioned the NSA to release the tapes under the "Freedom of Information Act".Find this CNN article: Here! Addendum #3 This essay appeared in The New Republic on 7/02/2001 and was titled:Partially quoted here in compliance with the Fair Use Doctrine (Quote) In 1967, at the height of the Six Day War, Israeli jets strafed and firebombed a seemingly hostile ship near the Sinai coast. Israeli torpedo boats quickly converged to finish the job, then abruptly ceased fire and offered assistance to the battered crew. Israel had attacked the USS Liberty. In all, 34 Americans died, and 171 were injured. Israeli leaders apologized promptly and profusely, explaining that they had mistaken the Liberty for an enemy vessel--an explanation that subsequent investigations in both the United States and Israel upheld. Israel compensated the injured sailors and the families of those killed. And that's where the story should have ended. After all, accidental attacks, though tragic, are common in war. In 1967 alone, "friendly fire" killed 5,373 Americans fighting in Vietnam.[end quote] So as Michael writes, "why are we still talking about the Liberty?" Why indeed. Because as long as there are Israelis there will be those who will invent these slanders. The Jewish people are the world's favorite scapegoat.Existential reality of the Jews. Go to The New Republic for this article and others which will challenge commonly held and often wrong perceptions. The New Republic is an excellent resource for information about the Middle East.Jay Cristol's book, "The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Attack on a U.S. Navy Spy Ship" is also worthwhile reading. Thanks to Judge Cristol the new tape evidence was released under the Freedom of Information Act and sheds new light on the incident and further proves Israel's attack on the USS Liberty was not intentional. However, like Judge Cristol says: "Those who hate Israel, who hate Jews, and those who believe in conspiracy will not be convinced by anything." USS Liberty Slanders (4) This slander has a life given to it by anti-Israel conspiracy theorists who like the JFK assassination will never accept the facts in this case. Each new revelation from the State Department or NSA is denied by conspiracists. In that respect it isn't much different than the blood libels or ZOG conspiracies. In point of fact it is just another variation on the "Jews killed Christ" theme. When haven't the Jews been the world's favorite scapegoat? If they can't get these things, they'll invent something else. And you can read about it on the interNUT, in both left and right wing mailing lists and newsgroups. No Coverup Here is a rambling post from a public mailing list: Copying it here is in compliance with every interpretation of the Fair Use Doctrine since the list is available to anyone subscribed to it and also publicly archived in various search engines on the net. Posted under the subject: "Marxism] USS Liberty inquiry--the cover-up continues" - by Jim Craven to a mailing list called "the Activists and Scholars in Marxist Tradition (marxism@lists.econ.utah.edu). It begins with excerpts from the Financial Times.(Quote) Tempers flare over US spy-ship inquiry By Guy Dinmore in WashingtonSurvivors of one of the most hotly disputed incidents in American military history - the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty spy-ship in 1967 - on Monday accused the US authorities, past and present, of a cover-up in backing Israeli claims that it was a tragic mistake. Emotions boiled over in the basement of the State Department as the Office of the Historian opened a public conference on the six-day Arab-Israeli war with heated debate over newly released intercepts from the archives of the secretive National Security Agency. Most of the basic facts are undisputed. On June 8 1967, Israeli aircraft and later torpedo boats struck the Liberty just off the Mediterranean coast, killing 34 crew and wounding 172. The ship, one of the world's most sophisticated listening vessels but only lightly armed, limped into port. From there the controversy begins. An immediate US Navy court of Inquiry backed the Israeli claim that it had been mistaken for an Egyptian warship. The US accepted $12m (?9.4m, £6.5m) in compensation. While some historians have accepted this, survivors and a varied group of academics and former military officials insist the attack was deliberate. "You're trying to whitewash it," one survivor shouted from the audience as Marc Susser, the State Department's historian, acted as moderator and sought to keep order, refusing to allow speeches from the floor. Even debate on the panel of invited historians descended into acrimony with one contributor accused of being an Israeli agent. Two recent developments added fuel to the controversy. Last week Ward Boston, a naval captain who acted as senior legal counsel for the Navy's court of inquiry in 1967, signed an affidavit declaring that the late Admiral Isaac Kidd, president of the court, had told him that President Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara, defence secretary, had ordered a cover-up. And on Monday, David Hatch, the National Security Agency's own historian, elaborated on the recently declassified NSA material, the first time the eavesdropping agency had released real voice intercepts. Mr Hatch confessed that the information "doesn't settle much". But his analysis of the conversations between an Israeli air controller and two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first they were attacking a US vessel, although there was mention of a US flag flying. He also regretted that the new NSA material did not clarify why the Liberty had not received orders sent to it to leave a war zone. Joseph Lentini, a survivor who has spent the past 36 years researching the tragedy, told reporters he remained convinced that the attack was deliberate. He admits it is hard to understand why the Israelis would want to sink a ship of its closest ally at a time of war. Conspiracy theories abound. (End Quote) Response from Jim C:From Bamford: "Although no one on the ship knew it at the time, the Liberty had suddenly trespassed into a private horror. At that very moment, near the minaret at El Arish, Israeli forces were engaged in a criminal slaughter...(pp.200-201) Note: What the Israeli's didn't know is that in addition to the Liberty recording Israeli radio chatter revealing the ongoing massacres of POWs at El Arish, there was also an EC-121 aircraft doing the same thing. They went after the Liberty to stop the surveillance and destroy what had been recorded thinking that the Liberty was the only witness. They didn't know that the EC-121 also had gathered the evidence including evidence from radio intercepts that the Israelis knew exactly who they were going after and why they were doing it. Jim C.The accusations are simply not credible but like all canards about Israel they are repeated ad nauseum and the myth sowers intentionally ignore the facts as they have done before and will continue to do in the future. Logic and reason have nothing to do with it. When confronted with the truth, Bamford and Craven's myths self-destruct. One can only guess at their motives. I have a clear idea what they are and I believe most of you will also. What follows is Michael Oren's refutation of the Bamford conspiracy which was published in The New Republic and is reproduced here in compliance with the Fair Use Doctrine. Why did Israeli troops attack the USS Liberty?... 07/23/2001Unfriendly Fire Michael Oren is a senior fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem. His excellent book on the 1967 Six Day War was published by Oxford University Press in 2002.In 1967, at the height of the Six Day War, Israeli jets strafed and firebombed a seemingly hostile ship near the Sinai coast. Israeli torpedo boats quickly converged to finish the job, then abruptly ceased fire and offered assistance to the battered crew. Israel had attacked the USS Liberty. In all, 34 Americans died, and 171 were injured. Israeli leaders apologized promptly and profusely, explaining that they had mistaken the Liberty for an enemy vessel--an explanation that subsequent investigations in both the United States and Israel upheld. Israel compensated the injured sailors and the families of those killed. And that's where the story should have ended. After all, accidental attacks, though tragic, are common in war. In 1967 alone, "friendly fire" killed 5,373 Americans fighting in Vietnam. But the controversy over the Liberty attack has endured, generating conspiracy theories, ethnic defamation, and charges of mass homicide. And, although a series of recently declassified documents seem to exonerate the Israelis once and for all, a new book, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency, has resurrected the canard by setting forth what is arguably the most audacious theory of all: that the Israelis deliberately attacked the Liberty to cover up a massacre of Egyptian prisoners of war. Written by James Bamford, a former ABC News producer, and published by Doubleday, the book has enjoyed a largely respectful, and frequently credulous, reception in the American press. Yet Body of Secrets has no more basis in fact than its predecessors. Indeed, it may be the shoddiest screed of all. The Liberty's fateful voyage began on June 2, 1967, when it set sail from Spain for the Middle East. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had just ousted U.N. peacekeepers from the Sinai, blockaded Israeli shipping through the Tiran Straits, and prepared the Arab world for a war of Israel's destruction. A wary White House instructed the Sixth Fleet to stay "outside an arc whose radius is 240 miles from [the Egyptian city of] Port Said." But, according to communications recently released by the National Archives, the Liberty's handlers in the National Security Agency ignored the order and directed the ship to a point just outside Egypt's territorial waters, a mere 12.5 miles, where it could eavesdrop on Egyptian officers and their Soviet advisers. Five subsequent cables from the Navy's European headquarters warned the Liberty to pull back to at least 100 miles, but the Navy's overly sophisticated radio system diverted them to the Philippines, and none reached the ship in time. Approaching the battle area at dawn, the Liberty's skipper, Commander William L. McGonagle, requested a destroyer escort, only to be reminded by the commander of the Sixth Fleet that the "Liberty is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters ... and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation." Israel, meanwhile, requested that the United States provide a naval liaison to facilitate its communication with the Navy. Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman had warned the White House that "if war breaks out, we would have no telephone number to call, no code for plane recognition, and no way to get in touch with the U.S. Sixth Fleet." The United States never approved the liaison, nor did it inform Israel of the Liberty's arrival in the area. Although it arrived too late to fulfill its original mission--most of Sinai had already fallen to Israel, so there were no Egyptian troops there to spy on--the Liberty nevertheless began patrolling between Port Said and Gaza, in a lane rarely used by commercial freighters and declared by Egypt as off-limits to neutral shipping. On June 8, just before six o'clock in the morning, an Israeli pilot reported finding a naval craft ("gray, bulky, with its bridge amidships") 70 miles west of Gaza. Though he did not report seeing a flag, he made out the hull marking "GTR-5," which was enough for Israeli commanders to identify the ship as the USS Liberty and to mark it as a neutral vessel on their control board. But at eleven o'clock in the morning, the watch at Israeli naval headquarters changed. The new officers, following procedures for removing old information and assuming the Liberty had sailed away, cleaned the board. For Israeli forces, the Liberty had ceased to exist. It would prove a key error. Less than a half-hour later, Israeli soldiers in the Sinai coastal town of El Arish heard a violent explosion. The cause was probably a detonation in an ammunition dump, but when the Israelis saw a ship off the coast, they assumed it was bombarding them, prompting the Israeli navy to dispatch three torpedo boats. The boats' commanders had standing orders to fire on any vessel going faster than 20 knots--a speed then attainable only by warships--and, miscalculating their target's speed as 30 knots, they prepared to attack. At that point, the Liberty turned toward Egypt. Worried they would lose their prey, Israeli naval commanders called in the air force. Two Mirages quickly swooped in. Returning from a bombing run, they were armed only with 30millimeter cannons and air-to-air missiles--hardly ideal for attacking a boat. But, failing to see either flags or markings on the ship, they strafed it. Minutes later came a second group of planes, equally ill-suited for a naval engagement: They carried napalm, a weapon used against land targets. But they dropped their canisters anyway, and one set fire to the deck, enshrouding the ship in smoke. It was at this junction that one Israeli pilot finally recognized Latin, not Arabic, letters on the hull, prompting Israeli air controllers to call off the action immediately. But, thanks to a breakdown in communications--again, a common occurrence in the heat of battle--the order never reached the navy. Israeli torpedo boats caught up with the Liberty just as one of the American sailors on board, heedless of McGonagle's order not to fire on the approaching craft, opened up with a deck gun. The Israeli captain consulted his intelligence manual, concluded that the ship shooting at him was the Egyptian naval freighter El Quseir, and fired back torpedoes. Just one hit, but it killed 25 men. The torpedo boats then closed in and circled the ship, strafing it with machine-gun fire, until the captain of one boat saw "GTR-5" on the hull. He immediately halted fire, extended help to the Liberty, and called for rescue helicopters. For many years following the attack, these details remained unknown--hidden in classified U.S. documents. And, in their absence, conspiracy theories flourished. The most damning made its debut in 1979, when Jim Ennes Jr., a former officer from the Liberty, published a book, Assault on the Liberty, arguing that the Israelis knew precisely who and what they were attacking. The Liberty's hull was distinctly marked, Ennes wrote, and a large American flag flew from its mast; yet Israeli ships and planes fired anyway. The motive? Israel, Ennes said, wanted to hide its impending conquest of Syria's Golan Heights, an invasion Washington opposed. The fact that the Israelis offered to assist the ship when they could easily have sunk it, or were unlikely to risk conflict with their most important ally, did not daunt Ennes. Ennes's theory found its way into Donald Neff's Warriors for Jerusalem (a pseudo-history of the Six Day War) and Stephen Green's sensationalist Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak took up the charge in their syndicated political column, as did a 1987 special on ABC's "20/20." Joining the cavalcade was Bamford, whose 1982 book The Puzzle Palace denounced Israel for masking its Golan aggression with "a violent act of terrorism" against the Liberty. Former American officials, such as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Thomas Moorer and U.N. Ambassador George Ball, have endorsed Ennes's theory. By 1995 an article in The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence could claim that "all serious scholarship on the subject accepts Israel's assault as having been perpetrated quite deliberately." (Ironically, only Arab authors believed the attack was accidental, insisting that the Liberty had actually been spying for Israel.) Then, in 1997, American and Israeli archives, observing the 30-year declassification rule, began releasing top-secret documents relevant to the case. On the U.S. side, these included the minutes of the Naval Board of Inquiry; communications between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and the Sixth Fleet; and internal CIA and National Security Agency (NSA) memoranda. Jerusalem made available the findings of three military investigations and a wealth of relevant diplomatic correspondence. Together, the new sources enabled researchers to reconstruct the precise sequence of events as described above. They also provided one other crucial piece of evidence: Diplomatic cables showed that Israel had informed Washington of its intention to attack Syria and that Washington had not objected--which eliminated Israel's supposed motive for the crime. So why are we still talking about the Liberty? Because Bamford, in his book, has discovered a new motive for Israel's alleged conspiracy. The day of the attack, he says, Israeli soldiers slaughtered 1,000 Egyptian civilians and prisoners of war near El Arish because they had become "nuisances" to their captors. The Liberty, Bamford goes on to explain, intercepted messages about the murders--and the Israelis feared word of their deeds might leak out. And so, Bamford concludes, they dispatched their armed forces with orders to kill. "[T]he Israelis had massacred civilians and prisoners in the desert," he writes, "and now they were prepared to ensure that no American survived the sinking of the Liberty." There are a lot of reasons to question Bamford's credibility, starting with his rather curious reading of Middle Eastern history. For example, Bamford says Israel initiated hostilities against Syria and Jordan, when it happened the other way around. There's also the fact that he cites not one shred of evidence to prove that the Liberty ever intercepted a message about the alleged massacre. And then there's the question of whether such a massacre occurred at all. Israel captured more than 10,000 Egyptians in the Six Day War, but there are no known records--Israeli, American, Egyptian, or U.N.--of the Israelis mistreating them, let alone shooting them. Egypt has ruled the Sinai for over 20 years, yet it has never uncovered any mass grave. While there were certainly isolated incidents of Israeli abuses, there's simply no reason to believe the massacre of 1,000 Egyptians ever took place. Indeed, Bamford's evidence on this point, which consists of a few testimonials, falls apart under even light scrutiny. Consider, first, the statement of Gabi Bron, who today covers the Knesset for Yediot Aharonot, Israel's largest daily. In the book, Bamford says Bron witnessed a massacre of 150 Egyptian prisoners at El Arish, citing a press clipping in which Bron is quoted as follows: "The Egyptian prisoners of war were ordered to dig pits and then army police shot them to death." But the Bron statement refers not to a mass killing of Egyptians but to an isolated incident: the execution of five Palestinian guerrillas who had posed as Egyptian soldiers after killing Israelis. Bamford would have learned this if, instead of relying on a clip, he had actually spoken to Bron, who is easily reachable. "The one hundred and fifty POWs were not shot, and there were no mass murders," Bron told me when I called. "In fact, we helped prisoners, gave them water, and in most cases just sent them in the direction of the [Suez] Canal." As further corroborating evidence, Bamford cites a statement by Aryeh Yitzhaki, a former historian of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In the statement--which Bamford also clipped from the press--Yitzhaki talks of compiling a report, which the army later suppressed, on mass killings. "Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff [Yitzhak] Rabin and the generals knew about these things," Yitzhaki is quoted as saying. "No one bothered to denounce them." But, once again, the source himself contradicts Bamford's interpretation. "In no case did Israel initiate massacres," Yitzhaki wrote me. "On the contrary, it did everything it could to prevent them." Yitzhaki admits that hundreds of Palestinian commandos were killed around El Arish. But that was in combat, he says, after they ambushed the IDF supply columns. Moreover, that battle took place on the night of June 9, more than a day after the attack on the Liberty. Bamford does cite an anonymous Egyptian who confirms the massacre. But, being anonymous, the source is impossible to verify. In addition, Bamford tries to prove guilt by association--or, at least, proximity--by noting that Israeli troops near El Arish were commanded by Ariel Sharon, the man "indirectly responsible" for the 1982 massacres in Lebanon. But Sharon's divisions were in Nakhle, more than 40 miles from El Arish; the coastal area was under the command of Israel Tal, a man not known for right-wing views. Finally, Bamford relies on the recollections of Marvin E. Nowicki. Today, Nowicki is a retired political scientist from Southern Illinois University. In 1967 he was a chief petty officer aboard an NSA aircraft spying on Israel. Fluent in Hebrew and Russian, Nowicki was listening to Israeli transmissions on the afternoon of June 8 when another translator mentioned hearing something about an "American flag." The voice emanated from a surface vessel, which Nowicki later deduced was one of the torpedo boats. Bamford seizes on that as grounds for indictment: "If the Israelis did see a flag, then the attack was cold-blooded murder--like the hundreds of earlier murders committed that day at El Arish." Cunningly, he inserts Nowicki's recollections immediately before his description of the torpedo attack, creating the impression that the Israelis first saw the flag, then fired. Further spliced into Nowicki's account are bloodthirsty quotes from Israeli pilots, as if Bamford were in possession of the spy plane's tapes. But the quotes were snipped, out of context, from a transcript of IDF communications made available to a 1987 Thames Television special on the Liberty. That very same transcript proved that the pilots went to great lengths to identify the ship and took considerable risks to rescue its survivors, whom they assumed were Egyptian. Nowicki had given Bamford his written testimony in the misguided belief that the author planned to extol the NSA's legacy. That document, provided to me by Judge A. Jay Cristol, a former naval aviator and author of a forthcoming book on the Liberty, unequivocally states: "Our intercepts showed the attack to be an accident on the part of the Israelis." Nowicki explains that the torpedo boats reported sighting the flag after the action had begun and stopped firing immediately. He later reiterated this conviction in a letter to The Wall Street Journal, affirming that "the aircraft and MTBs [Motor Torpedo Boats] prosecuted the Liberty until their operators had an opportunity to get close-in and see the flag, hence the references to the flag." Having laid out his theory of the attack, Bamford moves on to the alleged cover-up. Following the assault on the Liberty, he writes, American Jewish organizations conspired with the Johnson administration to quash any investigation of Israel. "With an election coming up, no one in the weak-kneed House and Senate wanted to offend powerful pro-Israel groups and lose their fat campaign contributions." No evidence whatsoever is presented to support this slur, which belies Bamford's contention that "critics [of Israel] are regularly silenced by outrageous charges of anti-Semitism." One would hardly expect such shoddy work to garner serious attention. But it has. Writing in The New York Times on April 23 ("book says israel intended 1967 attack on u.s. ship"), James Risen relayed Bamford's claims intact, without any attempt to solicit a countervailing view. In The Wall Street Journal, Timothy Naftali lauded Body of Secrets as an "authoritative and engaging book." National Public Radio invited Bamford on the syndicated talk show "Fresh Air," where he accused Israel of committing "massive war crimes" against Egyptian soldiers and civilians. The interviewer, Neal Conan, never challenged him. Indeed, only one critique to date--Joseph Finder's in The New York Times Book Review--dared to question Bamford's sources or the logic of Israel "perpetrating one massacre in order to cover up another." In his book, Bamford accuses Israel of fomenting "lies about who started the [1967] war, lies to the American President, lies to the U.N. Security Council, lies to the press, lies to the public." But Bamford is the one peddling untruths. And it's time the American press called him on it. (Also see A. Jay Cristol's response to Bamford's allegations on the History Network Website.) As someone who worked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon War Room (and alternate JCS), as a cryptologist, and crypt/analyst, I am in a unique position to provide an informed perspective.
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Seth: Gimme that. Alright, you look like a future pedophile in this picture, number 1. Number 2: it doesn't even have a first name, it just says "McLovin"! Evan: What? One name? ONE NAME!?!? Who are you? Seal? Seth: Fogell, this ID says that you're 25 years old. Why wouldn't you just put 21, man? Fogell: Seth, Seth, Seth. Listen up, ass-face: every day, hundreds of kids go into the liquor store with fake IDs, and every single one says they're 21. Pssh, how many 21 year olds do you think there are in this town? It's called f*cking strategy, alright?
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Recently, with the publication of the book, Assault an the Liberty, the American Congress appointed a committee, headed by Adlai Stevenson, for the purpose of investigating the affair and publishing the results of the investigation. Immediately upon learning of the appointment of the committee, it was decided that the History Department would research the affair and submit the official version of the State of Israel. This research is based upon all the primary and secondary evidence available. This article is the official version, written by Lt. Col. Math Greenberg Head of the Combat Research Branch. Uri Algom - Colonel Head of history Department INTRODUCTION On 8 June 1967, at the height of the "Six Day War," the American electronic-intelligence ship "Liberty" approached the Sinai coast. In the afternoon hours of the same day, the ship was attacked by air and naval forces of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Thirty-four crew members were killed in the attack while 164 were wounded, and the ship suffered damage. The tragic attack on the "Liberty" was an innocent mistake, caused by incorrect target identification and faulty data analysis, due to the ambiguities end pressures of the situation in which Israel was involved. It is important to note that the actions of the "Liberty" itself were also a contributing factor to the mistaken attack. Immediately the Israelis appreciated their mistake, they halted their attack and took steps to provide assistance to the damaged ship (their offers were rejected). Israel expressed her regrets over the incident and explained that the attack was unintentional. The IDF undertook the task of determining the facts and to this end a Court of Inquiry was formed and an examining-judge was appointed. The findings of the investigation brought to tight the circumstances of the case and revealed a series of mistakes which led to the attack. However, the investigation did not uncover a single finding which could point to either malicious intent or criminal negligence. The Israeli Government made available the findings of the investigation to the American authorities and agreed, out of humanitarian considerations, to make immediate compensation payments to wounded crew members end the families of those who were killed. Despite Israeli declarations and explanations, accepted by the Johnson administration, the issue occasionally rakes newspaper headlines and excites rumours, All those who seek to revive the episode share one thing in common, they all claim that Israel premeditatedly and maliciously attacked the "Liberty" with the intent of sinking her. In order to substantiate this claim a list of explanations is presented, some of which way be classified as "science fiction", some of which result from an erroneous presentation and interpretation of the facts or unfounded assumptions. The object of this paper is to present an authoritative version of the circumstances and chain of events which led to the "Liberty" incident and to respond to some of the claim regarding Israel's intentions. CHAPTER ONE THE "LIBERTY" AHD HER MOVEMENTS UP TO ISRAEL 'S COAST1 "Liberty" was built at the Portland , Oregon Shipyards towards the end of the Second World War. The ship was christened "Simmons Victory". She was launched in May 1945, and served as a cargo shop on the Pacific Ocean lane. Her mission functions did not change after the war, and the ship was used for transporting equipment and supplies during the Korean War. In 1958 the vessel was decommissioned and anchored at the national reserve fleet anchorage. In February, 1963, the U.S. Navy purchased the vessel and, in the course of 22 months of repair work at the Portland shipyards, had the craft refitted as an electronic-intelligence ship, and rechristened as the USS "Liberty". The ship was classified as Auxiliary General Technical Research-5 (AGTR-5) -- i.e. an auxiliary ship (noncombat), designated for general technical research. "Liberty" was the fifth U.S. Navy vessel so classified. In December 1964, "Liberty" was commissioned and after a series of sea trials was assigned to missions along the African coast, in the area between Cape Town and Dakar. On 25 April 1966, Commander William McGonagle was given command of the "Liberty". He was the ship's commander at the time of the attack. On 2 May 1967, the "Liberty" sailed from her home port in Norfolk to her patrol area off the African coast, and towards the end of the month entered the port of Abidjan, or the Ivory Coast, for resupply purposes. On her second night at port, a telegram arrived ordering the ship to put to sea immediately and sail "at best possible speed" to Rota, Spain2. There, the "Liberty" was to take on supplies and equipment and continue to a new operations area off Port Said. Detailed orders were to follow later. Within a few hours, the "Liberty" sailed for Rota and arrived on 1 June 1967. An additional order, which arrived while still at sea, instructed the "Liberty" to proceed from Rota to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and to patrol 13 miles off the Gaza Strip coastline. Upon arrival in Spain, supplies and equipment were loaded on the ship. Three enlisted Marines and three civilian technicians joined the crew for her new mission. However, the ship was delayed due to an hydraulic leak in the antenna system. The "Liberty" set out on its mission to the Mediterranean on 2 June 1967. In this area the ship came under commend of the Sixth Fleet. Intelligence-Ship "Liberty" GTR-5 We have no clear information as to the exact mission of the "Liberty" along the shores of the Middle East and publications which appeared on the subject could not fully answer this question. However, it is significant that the "Liberty" was dispatched immediately after the U.N. force was withdrawn and Egypt 's Gammal Abdul Nasser blockaded the Straits of Tiran. Thus, it appears the U.S. wanted an "electronic ear" in the area, which could monitor unfolding developments in the crisis, gather information and provide first hand reports. "Liberty" was equipped with the necessary means for gathering, processing and analyzing the required intelligence data. While the "Liberty" was speeding its way to its patrol area, the Six Day War erupted. This development created a certain tension aboard ship, and the crew were cognizant of the danger involved in an undefended vessel's approaching a combat zone. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was also aware of the " Liberty's" situation; on the night of 7 8 June, the Office of the JCS issued an order limiting the ship's approach to 20 miles from the coast and afterwards instructed the vessel to distance itself 100 miles from the coastline. But these instructions did not reach the "Liberty" and she continued on her original mission. The "Liberty 's" commander was also concerned about the order to operate within visual range of the coast, and apparently considered distancing the ship from the dangers inherent in such a station. On the evening of 7 June (a few hours before the ship reached the area), the commander of the "Liberty" checked with the officer responsible, as to how the mission would be affected if the "Liberty" were to stay farther out at sea. The officer responded that his personnel intended to operate on UHF frequencies which necessitated line of sight with the coast; a positioning below the horizon would reduce mission efficiency by 80%.3 In the light of this professional opinion, the ship's captain determined to approach the coast, notwithstanding the danger, in order to execute his mission more efficiently. CHAPTER TWO ATTACK ON THE "LIBERTY" THEATRE OF BATTLE AT THE TIME OF THE "LIBERTY'S" APPEARANCE. The "Liberty" made its appearance at the theatre of operations on 8 June at the height of the war. Although it was clear that the scales were shifting in favor of Israel's rapidly advancing forces, on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts, the end of the war was still not in sight and the Arab states had not yet agreed to a cease-fire. The Syrians continued to shell civilian settlements all along Israel's northern front. Israeli artillery returned the fire, and artillery duels continued the entire day. Israel Air Force planes also attacked Syrian fortifications and artillery positions. On the Jordanian front, Israel had succeeded in gaining complete control of the Jordan Valley up to the Jordan River, and Jordan declared its acceptance of a cease fire at 1025 hours. The naval theatre was also active. Three Egyptian submarines were cruising in the theatre of operations but their exact position was as yet undetermined.4 At approximately 0900 hours, submarine 'tracks" west of Atlit were discovered and the enemy submarine was attacked by vessels of the Navy.5 After three hours, a report was received about the appearance of a submarine periscope off Rosh Hanikra. (The border checkpost between Israel and the Lebanon , on the coast). Thus, the "Liberty" had entered an arena in which hostilities were being conducted between two belligerent parties. Moreover, Egypt herself on 23 May 1967 declared as prohibited to maritime traffic, the area off the coast, up to a distance of 14 miles from the shore.6 DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE "LIBERTY". On 8 June, at 0410 hours, an IAF "Nord" aircraft took oft with a naval officer aboard serving as an aerial observer. This air reconnaissance patrol was part of the routine coastal security measures. The patrol set out at first light, parallel to Israel's shores and over the open sea. (An additional patrol of the same type proceeded from 1530 hours until nightfall). The patrol's mission was to detect ship movements before vessels could enter coastal radar detection [page 7] range. The airborne observer would make a brief report of each detection at the moment visual contact was wade; additional information would be transmitted in the debriefing, after the plane's landing. At approximately 0545, an unclear message was received from the plane at Central Coastal Command (CLC-Combat Information Center-Central Coast). After clarification with the Navy representative at Air Commands the observation plane was reported to have sighted a ship, apparently a destroyer, sailing 70 miles west of Gaza. The ship was designated as "Skunk-C" on the Control Table, and marked red - i.e. an unidentified target. Later, at 0603 hours, an additional report arrived from the plane, which described the vessel as a supply ship of the US Navy. The report was not unusual. Aerial observers had often reported on the presence of this type of craft, but such vessels would always change direction and disappear far from the coast.7 Although the ship had been identified by the aerial observer, the target remained colored in red since the team at Central Coastal Command (hereafter referred to as CCC) were not positively sure of the ship's identity.8 At approximately 0900 hours, following the discovery of the enemy submarine off Atlit, GOC Israel Navy arrived at the (CCC) bridge. During a break in the activity surrounding the submarine, GOC Navy inquired about "Skunk C", and after receiving en explanation concerning the vessel, instructed that the ship be marked green i.e, a neutral craft. At about the same time, a report arrived at Regional Control 501; the report stated that an IAF pilot, returning from a mission in Sinai, had spotted a ship 20 miles north of E1 Arish and that when he had tried to identify the vessel it had opened fire upon him.9. Reacting to this report, Head of Naval Operations Section/3 (a section in the Naval Operations Department) instructed Israel Navy destroyers "Jaffa" and "Eilat" (who were patrolling along the coast) to turn south and verity the identity of the vessel. However, the destroyers were ordered to return to their patrol sectors at 0940 hours, after an additional report arrived from Regional Control 501, that in the light of the pilot's debriefing, there was no certainty that he had indeed been fired upon by the ship.10 The report likewise stated that, "the ship is colored grey blue, very wide and the bridge is in the middle." Meanwhile, the "Nord" plane which had been patrolling the sea had landed and the observer was debriefed by Lt. Commander Pinchasi, a navy representative at Air Command, The observer reported spotting the marking GTR-5, [page 8] on the ship's side. Lt. Commander Pinchasi checked the marking in a "Janes" manual and learned that the reference was to the intelligence ship named "Liberty". He reported the information to Naval Operations Section/3 and since the reference was to an intelligence ship he likewise reported to Naval Operations Section/4 (intelligence).11 Commander Lunz had relieved the Head of Naval Operations section/3 (who retired to rest) and was the officer who received the report. However, he did not see anything new in the debriefing but rather a complementary report to the one received at 0500 hours, Since he did not have information as to the present location of the "Liberty" he gave the order (at 1100 hours) to erase the vessel from the CCC control table. This order was given in accordance with the accepted updating procedure for maintaining an up-to the minute picture at the CCC control table.12 By this action, the "Liberty" was, for all practical purposes, removed from the agenda. The detection of the "Liberty" at that location (far from the theatre of battle) was not unusual and did not require special attention or tracking. Certainly no danger was discerned that might have necessitated a response and it was reasonable to assume that the ship would turn round and sail away. In addition, it was common practice to erase targets which had disappeared from range.13 These were almost certainly the considerations which guided Commander Lunz when he ordered the erasure of "Liberty" from the CCC control table.14 A short time after the erasure of "Liberty" from the CCC control table, a series of events transpired which led to the detection of the ship a second time now under circumstances which led to a tragic mistake. REPORT ON THE SHELLING OF EL-ARISH AND DISPATCHING OF THE TORPEDO BOATS. At 1124 hours, the naval representative at Air Command reported to Naval Operation Section/3, on the shelling of E1-Arish from the sea, Commander Lunz passed on the report to Chief of Naval Operations, Captain (Navy) Rahav, and he to turn instructed Lt. Commander Pinchasi, in no uncertain terms, to check the source of the report.15 The inquiry into the source of the report was ordered because of the many reports which had been received concerning shelling from the sea and which were later proven to be false, The feeling was that this report was probably no different. that the source of the report was an Air-Ground Support Officer in El-Arish; the Navy representative at the Supreme Command,16 Lt. Commander Tel, also informed Lt. Commander Pinchasi that a similar report had been received enquiry to Naval Operations/3.17 Meanwhile the shelling of the coastline also aroused interest at Supreme Command. The Head of Operations Section, Lt, Colonel Haim Nadel, (during a meeting with the COS at 1127 hours), received a report from G Branch- Southern Command, stating that a ship had been shelling E1-Arish but the shells had not reached the coast. The Head of Operations Section immediately ordered that the report be verified, and more important instituted a check to see if there were no Israel Navy vessels off the coast of El-Arish.18 Meanwhile, another report arrived from Southern Command (at 1145 hours), which stated that two ships were approaching the EL-Arish coast.19 These reports were passed to Fleet Operations Control Center - to Commander Lunz and Captain (Navy) Rahav. The accumulation of reports from various sources and the involvement of Supreme Commend in the matter, indicated that these reports were not baseless and should be taken seriously.20 Therefore, the chief of Naval Operations ordered21 (at 1205 hours) torpedo boat Division 914 to set out for El Arish. At this point, the Division commander was instructed to patrol only in the direction of El-Arish but he was not yet informed of the shelling of E1 Arish nor was he told what to look for in the area to which he was dispatched.20 Division 914 ("Pagoda" on the radio code), under the command of Commander Moshe Oren, consisted at that time of three torpedo boats - T203, T204 and T206; the flagship was T204, with the Division commander aboard. The Division had left Ashdod Port at 1120 hours, with the task of patrolling between Ashdod mad Ashkelon, At 1215 fours, the Division received an order from Naval Operations/3 to change course and to assume a position 20 miles north of E1 Arish and to patrol that region.23 Meanwhile, the enquiry at Supreme Command into the shelling of El-Arish continued and the Head of Operations Section was informed that no Israel Navy vessels were in the area but that three torpedo boats were on their way, The Head of Operations Section concluded that when the torpedo boats made contact with the vessel responsible for shelling the coast, they should request close air support from the IAF.24 Division 914 continued on her way to EL-Arish and after an hour's sailing (at 1317 hours) she was informed (by Naval Operations/3) of the shelling from the sea, of EL-Arish, The Division commander was told to listen to the air-sea-liaison radio channel (86 and 186) and that IAF planes would to dispatched to the area after the target had been detected by the Division.25 At 1341 hours, the Division detected the target on its radar 20 miles northwest of E1 Arish and 14 miles off the coast of Bardewil. The officer at the C1C on the flagship, Ensign Yifrach Aharon, reported that the target had been detected at a range of 22 miles, that her speed had been tracked for a few minutes, after which he had determined that the target was moving westward at a speed of 30 knots.26 These data were forwarded to the Fleet Operations Control Center. The speed of the target detected by the Israel Naval Division was significant in that it indicated, beyond doubt, that the target was a combat vessel - since only combat ships can develop such high speeds. Standing Israel Navy operation procedures state explicitly: "When there are reports of an enemy in the theatre, and radar detects one or more ships sailing at a speed above 20 knots, they shall be considered hostile and no further identification shall be carried out."27 The given data created the impression at Naval Operations of an enemy ship, turning to escape in the direction of Port Said. The Chief of Naval Operations asked the Division to double-check their calculations. A second check confirmed the direction of the target, but her speed was corrected to 28 knots. Since the Israel Navy Division was cruising at the same speed as the target, and therefore could not intercept it the Division commander requested that IAF planes be dispatched.28 In retrospect, it is clear that the data dealing with target speed were incorrect since the "Liberty" was not capable of cruising at such high speeds. However, it is astounding that the same target speed was measured independently by two torpedo boats: T204 (with the Division commander aboard) and T203 which estimated target speed at 25 - 28 knots. The CIC officer on torpedo boat T204 later presented several possible explanations for the mistaken estimate of the target's cruising speed. Either the radar screen "jumped", or the radar operator read the information incorrectly, or the statistics were incorrectly recorded on the CIC plot - or a combination of all the above. (The detection of the target at a range of 22 miles was also unusual, since normal detection range was considered to be 12 - 15 miles).29 The GDC Navy at the time, Rear-Admiral Shlomoh Arel noted that torpedo boats are prone to error in determining the speed of a ship moving in front of them, especially if the measurements are carried out with short, intermittent pauses.30 In view of the repeated reports on the shelling of EL-Arish from the sea, the detection of target by Division 914 and its report on the direction and speed of the target, a clear-cut picture emerged at Naval Headquarters of an enemy ship trying to escape and it was clear that all means available would have to be used in order to overtake and attack the vessel. Under the conditions at that time the attack could be carried out only by IAF planes and the Chief of Naval Operations requested that planes be dispatched to the target. At this point it is important to note that in accordance with the coordination procedures between the naval and air arms of the IDF, the naval theatre is under the sole jurisdiction of the naval arm and the IAF operates in this arena according to Navy instructions, in regards to identifying and attacking targets. DISPATCH OF THE PLANES At 1348 hours, the Chief of Naval Operations asked that the planes be dispatched. Lt. Colonel Kislev, the senior control officer at IAF Commend, instructed the control unit to divert a pair of "Mirage" aircraft ("Kursa" formation), which were returning from a patrol along the Suez Carl, Although another aircraft formation ("Menorah") consisting of 4 "Mirage" aircraft, was closer to the region, Lt. Colonel Kislev ordered that those planes should not be diverted from their mission (an attack on surface to air missiles along the Suez Canal) which was considered to be more important.31 As stated above IAF operations at sea were conditional on the Navy's authorization, and Air Command therefore insisted on receiving a definite clearance it to attack the ship or not.32 Lt. Commander Pinchasi passed on the question to Naval Operations Section/3, and the Chief of Naval Operations granted permission to attack.33 His intention was to have the planes attack the target ship and delay her until the torpedo boat division could arrive and enter combat.34 Lt, Commander Pinchasi forwarded the authorization to identity the ship as a combat vessel and then attack. The identification of the vessel was not intended to check the ship's nationality, but rather to emphasize the aim of attacking only is warship, and thus to avoid unnecessarily hitting Israel Navy torpedo boats.35 To this end, he emphasized that contact should be established between the aircraft and torpedo boats. Lt. Colonel Kislev passed the attack authorization and instruction to establish contact with the torpedo boats to the vicinity, to Regional Control 501 (on band 186).36 The control unit passed on the instructions to the IAF planes. The two "Mirage" aircraft reached the ship at approximately 1400 hours. The formation leader, Captain Spector, descended to a height of 3,000 feet and circled the vessel twice; his number two executed one identification run. These runs revealed to the pilots that the ship was not an Israeli vessel since she did not have the identifying markings (a white cross on a red background). The ship was colored battleship grey, had a foremast, one smokestack and two guns an her bow. No flag or other identifying sign was discerned. The formation leader reported this to the torpedo boats and Control and then the aircraft received permission to attack. At 1400 hours the "Mirage" planes attacked the "Liberty" and executed four strafing runs, firing only with their guns since they had no other ordnance available. Good hits were scored by the strafing runs. Damage could be discerned on the body of the ship and fire broke out on her portside.37 According to the commander of the "Liberty", the American flag, which was flying on the mast during the attack, was also knocked down.38 While the "Mirage" attack was proceeding, the Commander of Regional Control 501 experienced momentary doubts as to the identity of the vessel. It appeared that with the start of the attack, when the commander of Regional Control 501 informed the Navy representative at Regional Control of the ongoing operation the latter was not yet aware of the assault and immediately called Fleet Operations Control Center. Any doubt was immediately removed when the Navy representative at Regional Control announced that it was "okay".39 The entire clarification lasted a short tine and in effect the attack was not interrupted at all. Meanwhile, Lt. Colonel Kisslev directed an additional aircraft formation to the ship. This was a pair of Super Mystere aircraft ("Royal" formation) on its way to the Mitla Pass. Control Informed Lt. Kisslev that this formation was armed with napalm, not effective for attacking ships. But in spite of this fact he instructed the formation to join the attack with "whatever they have".30 The "Royal" formation passed over the ship at a height of 15,000 feet, as the previous formation was executing its last strafing run. The formation executed two attack runs with napalm, and one napalm bomb struck the ship. The lack of response from the ship raised suspicions in the mind of the formation leader and he decided to descend for an identification run. In this first run he discerned letters on the ship's bow but did not succeed in reading them clearly although the marking looked like P 30. In order to be sure the pilot descended for a second, slower identification run at a height of about 30 meters and then he was able to discern the letters CTR 5 ("Charley", "Tango", "Romeo") and reported this to control. Although he for a flag or other identification marking, he detected nothing.41 When the pilot's report (on the letter identification) arrived, Lt. Colonel Kisslev immediately instructed the aircraft to "disengage" and requested a report on the damage caused to the ship. The pilot reported "many hits on the upper section" and that the ship was smoking, with personnel apparently jumping overboard, Lt. Kisslev dispatched helicopters to the ship in order to search for and retrieve survlvors.42 The aircraft left the area at 1416 hours. In the final analysis, "Liberty" was attacked by four IAF aircraft which flew over the vessel for approximately 20 minutes, executed four strafing runs, four napalm attack runs and a number of identification runs. However, this short attack caused damage to the ship, hit its machine gun positions and the bridge, lit two fuel tanks which resulted to the outbreak of a large tire on deck, and also inflicted casualties among the crew. THE TORPEDO BOAT APPROACH As the IAF planes broke off the attack the Israel Navy torpedo boats approached the ship. The first aircraft formation contacted the Division; T206 maintained radio communication and forwarded reports to the Division Commander (T204 did not maintain contact with the planes). Thus, he was informed that the target was a destroyer of the "Z" or "HUNT" class. The smoke rising from the target, following the air attack, marked the spot and the torpedo boats closed in rapidly.43 At 1411 hours, the Division Commander was told that the aircraft were finishing their final run and departing - and that now he was to attack. And indeed, after the planes departed, the Division Commander ordered the torpedo boats (at 1418 hours) to launch a torpedo attack. However, this attack was delayed. Air Command informed Fleet Operations Control Center, of the discovery of the letters on the ship's side and Naval Operations/3 instructed the Division (at 1420 hours) not to attack since there was possibly a mistake in the identification of the vesse1.44 The Chief of Naval Operations also ordered the attack delayed but for another reason. He wanted the Division to delay its attack until it was within effective firing range, and not to open fire from too far away. The letters on the ship's side appeared to him as an Egyptian deception tactic, an enemy effort to operate in daytime in spite of Israel 's air superiority in the region. He did not believe that another ship could possibly be in the area.45 The Commander of Division 914, who was on the bridge, later testified that he did not receive the order from Naval Operations/3.46 However, the Division approached the target to within visual range and immediately realized that the ship was not a destroyer but rather a merchant or supply ship. An attempt was made to identify the vessel, although this was difficult due to the billowing clouds of smoke which enveloped the vessel; only her bow, part of her bridge and the tip of her mast could be discerned. As a result, the Division Commander cancelled the attack order.47 Even though the torpedo attack was delayed for a variety of different reasons, the end result was the same the torpedo Division held its fire and approached the target in order to more clearly identify the vessel. At 1427 hours the Division commander signaled the target ship requesting identification -"What ship?". The answer received was "AA" - i.e. "Identity yourself first". This appeared to be an evasive answer, which did not satisfy the identification request. This response was identical to the answer given by the "Ibrahim-el-Awal" (an Egyptian destroyer) during the Sinai Campaign, when she was asked to identify herself by the Israel Navy destroyers which had closed in on her. This fact was etched in the memory of the Division commander.48 In addition, the latter discerned flashes of gunshot fire emanating from the ship, and the commander of T203 saw the fire and reported hits in the vicinity of T-206.49 Since he still did not possess any clear confirmation of the ship's identity, he requested that the identification guide to Arab fleets be brought to him. After an examination of the pamphlet, he identified the target as an Egyptian supply ship, the "EL-Quseir". At the same time, the commander of T203 also tried to identity the vessel and without any connection to the Division commander's conclusions, likewise identified the vessel as the '"EL-Quseir", due to the ship's silhouette and what appeared to be a gun mounted on her bow.50 THE TORPEDO ATTACK This combination of factors - an evasive answer the identification request the identification of the ship by two torpedo boats as the Egyptian "El-Quseir", and the apparent gunshot fire emanating from the ship, indicated clearly at that time that this was an enemy craft. The Division commander reported his identification of the vessel to Naval Operations/3 and then ordered (at 1437) a torpedo attack. The torpedo beats moved in on the target, with guns firing and after a few minutes (at 1443 hours) opened with torpedo fire; according to the following sequence:51 A) T206 attacked first and fired one torpedo from a range of 1,000 yards and a second torpedo from a range of 550 yards; both were seen moving on course to the target but no hits were discerned. B) T203 attacked a minute later and fired two torpedoes from a range of 2,000 yards. The right torpedo went off course, but the second torpedo hit the target and exploded on the ship's starboard underneath the waterline. C) Finally, T204 attacked and fired only one torpedo which was not seen as traveling on target course at all. The Division commander gave the order to prepare for an additional attack from the target's other side and the torpedo boats moved to the ship's portside, off the ship's bow and stern. While proceeding to the target's other side, the torpedo boats entered closer range and discovered the letters GTR on the ship's bow. The Division commander ordered the immediate cessation of all fire. The time was 1447 hours.52 Even at this stage, there was still no flag discernable on the ship, and only later, at closer range was the Division commander able to see a small flag and code flag which bore the ship's name.53 The Division commander immediately reported these facts to Naval Operations/3 and received Instructions to search for survivors and identity the ship's nationality. In response, the Division commander (at 1451 hours) stated that the ship might possibly be Russian; this, due to the letters marked on the ship's side and the letters marked on the flag. The Division commander also reported that the ship was giving off smoke and pitching over onto its starboard side.54 This report raised serious concern at General Staff Headquarters. The COS Informed the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, and even convened a meeting in order to examine the possibility that the Russians would exploit the incident in order to intervene in force on the side of the Arabs.55 Fleet Operations Control Center first ordered the Division to return to El Arish, but then changed the order and instructed the torpedo boats to make a close up identification of the vessel. At 1520 hours, the Division commander reported that the ship was American, He noted that the ship was listing on its starboard side and that the crew had brought the fire under control and the vessel was moving slowly.56 Beforehand (1503 hours), two helicopters had hovered near the ship in order to search for survivors and one of them had spotted an American flag on the ship's mast. The helicopters also reported on crewmen jumping overboard. After twenty minutes, the helicopters received orders to return.57 Naval Operations/3 ordered the Division to stay in place and await instructions. At the same time the Port of Ashdod was ordered to prepare two tugs for immediate dispatch to the ship. At 1536 hours, Naval Operations/3 ordered the Division to approach and search for survivors. As the torpedo boats approached, T206 fished out a rescue craft (of US manufacture), but with no personnel aboard. The search did not reveal any survivors. After ten minutes the Division received an order to start moving towards EL Arish. At 1602 hours, GOC Navy radioed the Division commander and told him that the tugs had been dispatched from Ashdod and he enquired into the possibility of towing the ship to Ashdod. GOC Navy instructed the Division commander to approach the ship and offer assistance over the loudspeaker, but not to board the ship. GOC Navy also emphasized the importance of saving lives and ordered out a helicopter to search for any wounded.58 The Division approached the ship at 1640 hours and was able to discern the ship's name. The Division's offer of assistance was immediately rejected; the Division commander wished the ship a safe journey and reported back to G0C Navy. In accordance with the instructions received, the Division monitored the "Liberty's" progress for some time, and at 1704 hours, received an order to return to Ashdod. The Division returned to base and at 1750 hours the "Liberty" disappeared from her radar screen. CHAPTER THREE CAUSES OF THE ERROR The attack on the "Liberty" by I.D.F. air and naval forces was the result of a chain of innocent misunderstandings and errors which occurred in the course of hostilities. Among these we may cite: A. The "Liberty's" Scrape From The Control Table Commander Lunz, who ordered the vessel's erasure, acted in accordance with the accepted procedure of erasing targets which lie beyond radar range. The reason for this procedure is to ensure that the control table gives a clear and up-to-date picture. In any case, Commander Lunz had every reason to assume that the Chief of Naval Operations and the GOC Israel Navy were aware of the "Liberty 's" existence in the region, since both had taken her presence into account during the conduct of their operations against the submarine (Vide Supra p.7). The truth of the matter was, however, that the Chief of Naval Operations was unaware of the ship's existence and when the vessel was discovered by the torpedo boats he was convinced that it was a hostile target. In addition Commander Lunz. who was aware of the " Liberty 's" existence, was led astray by the vessel's alleged high speed as reported by the torpedo boats. He therefore assumed that the target which was discovered was not the "Liberty" but rather an enemy craft. Later on, wham the aircraft reported identifying the letters, Commander Lunz's suspicion was aroused. But at that time he was no longer in command. The Chief of Naval Operation, who was on hand, had heard the report along with him. He therefore did not consider it necessary to reiterate the report to the CNO. Lastly the identification of the vessel as the Egyptian "E1 Quseir" dissipated all further doubts. B) The Report On The Shelling Of The EL-Arish Coast The report was at first net with skepticism due to the plethora of such reports received during the previous day. The Chief of Naval Operations therefore ordered a check on the source of the reports. After the source was verified and additional reports were received, the Supreme Command [page 21] intervened, as the matter required serious attention. The Chief of Naval Operations therefore ordered Division 914 to abandon its petrol course and to investigate the situation off the coast of EL-Arish. The Chief of Naval Operations intentionally ordered the division to reconnoiter rather than assigning her a specific mission inasmuch as he was not fully convinced that the coast was indeed being shelled and wanted an objective confirmation. First it was for this same reason that he did not inform the Division that the coast was being shelled.59 The report of the shelling (which was later proven to be incorrect) was the first element in the chain of events which resulted in the tragic attack on the Liberty. C. The Detection Of The Target By Division 914 The Division spotted the target on the radar screen at a range of 22 miles and measured its speed and course. The target's speed was measured separately by each of the Division's vessels - with identical results. The high speed of the target (30 knots) indicated clearly that the vessel was a warship, and, in accordance with standard navy procedures followed at that time, this information provided sufficient grounds upon which to identify the target positively as a hostile craft. Despite this, the speed was checked once again, and it remained high. Given the vessel's speed and its course towards Port Said, it appeared to the Division commander and to Naval Headquarters that the target was an enemy warship escaping to its home port. Given such circumstances, a fleeing enemy vessel and the inability of the Division to overtake it, the Division commander took the only effective step and ordered out aircraft. Later, at the time of the air attack, it was discovered that the vessel's speed had been reduced to 12 knots. However, the Division commander did not attribute importance to this fact, since it appeared that the reduction in speed was due to the air raid. D. The Identification Of The Vessel By The Aircraft. The aircraft headed for the vessel, and, while in flight, they wire informed by Control that the target was an enemy ship and that they should proceed to attack her. When the aircraft arrived at the sight they perceived a large, gray-colored vessel, apparently a destroyer. What appeared to be a gun was mounted on its bow, a distinctive feature of a warship. Despite this, the aircraft carried out identification runs, in an attempt to discover any identifying markings. Only after they had failed to detect any such markings did they then proceed to attack the target. E. The Identification Of The Target As The "El-Quseir" When Division 914 arrived within eyesight of the vessel, the division commander discerned that the vessel was not a destroyer but rather a mercantile or supply ship. Due to his doubts, he rescinded the order to torpedo the vessel end proceeded to identity the craft. The evasive answer which he received from the vessel in response to his demands of her to identify herself, as well as the gunshot flashes which emanated from the target, strengthened his belief that he was confronted with an enemy craft. The enemy vessel was identified by him and by the other torpedo boat - as the "El Quseir". While it is true that the "EL Quseir" and the "Liberty" are not identical in appearance, they do resemble each other, Given the conditions which prevailed at the time (the "Liberty" was enveloped in smoke), such an identification was made independently by two different officers on two different torpedo boats. One of course may question the inherent contradictions between the various observations of the target identified as the "EL Quseir", a supply ship. It should have been obvious that the vessel was incapable of sailing at a speed of 30 knots, or of shelling the coast. However, at the time of the battle, it was assumed that the target was a mender of a naval task force which had succeeded to escaping and that the target had fallen behind due to the limitations on its speed.60 The accumulation and interlocking of the above mentioned factors created the erroneous (though justifiable, given the circumstances of the incident) picture of an enemy attempting to flee at top speed after a hit-and-run raid. Under such circumstances it is natural for a pursuing Israeli force to do all in its power to strike and capture the vessel. In addition to the above mentioned factors the conduct of the "Liberty" herself contributed greatly to the creation of the "chain of errors". The following aspects of the "Liberty 's" behaviour helped create the impression that she was indeed an enemy craft: A. The "Liberty's" Position. The "Liberty" was attacked in a combat zone, far removed from any recognized international shipping lane. Her very presence in the area provided grounds enough for the assumption that she was an enemy vessel. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff at the time Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin noted: "On 5 June 1967, we approached the American naval attaché and said "We shall protect our coastline against Egyptian attack by a combination of air and naval forces. We shall not be able to delay our reaction to the presence of Egyptian vessels in the proximity of our coast. We request you to withdraw all of your vessels from the Israeli coast or to inform us of their exert positions in the area close to our coastline."61 The American Command was, or at least should have been aware of the danger entailed by the "Liberty 's" presence in the area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in fact did order the vessel's withdrawal from the coast, only this order "lost its way" amongst the maze of bureaucracy and the military chain of command, and never reached the "Liberty."62 It is almost certain that had this order been carried out it would have been possible to avoid this tragic incident. B. The Difficulty in Identification. The "Liberty" bore the accepted identification signs for peace time. However these signs were insufficient for aerial identification. The vessel's color was battleship grey and the aircraft which carried out the identification runs did not discern any identifying signs or any flag which right indicate its identity. The U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry likewise established that the vessel's slow speed rendered it difficult for attacking planes to distinguish its flag.63 (i.e. with little wind, the flag drooped, thus its markings were indiscernible) Even when the torpedo boats advanced to within eyesight of the vessel in an attempt to identify her, they did not sea any flag. The " Liberty 's" commander testified in fact that the flag had been knocked down in the course of the air raid and that he had ordered another flag hoisted.64 Even if this flag was hoisted the torpedo boats did not see it, apparently due to the smoke which shrouded the vessel. When the torpedo Division commander asked the vessel to identify herself, he received an evasive reply. Under such circumstances it would appear that the "Liberty" should have availed herself of all possible means to identify herself (e. g. by hoisting numerous flags and semaphores, lighting signal lamps and flares) in order to attract the attention of the attacking force. Such measures would have been all the more appropriate given the fact that the "Liberty 's" commander believed that the air raid had been carried out by error.65 He did, it is true, try to prevent his vessel opening fire on the approaching torpedo boats, but his machine-gunners did not receive the command to hold fire, and instead opened fire on the Israeli boats. The fire only strengthened the Israelis' impression that the ship was indeed an enemy vessel. The "Liberty 's" behaviour leads one to conjecture "that she did all in her power to conceal her identity". These errors which were interrelated and stemmed from one another, led to the creation of the erroneous picture of the "Liberty" being a hostile vessel and to the inevitable result - the attack on the "Liberty." CHAPTER FOUR ISRAEL'S ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT As soon as Israel became aware of the error, she took actions whose immediate aim was to save human life, and, at a later stage, to investigate the incident and determine its causes. Assistance Offered and The Search for Survivors Immediately after the incident, Israel Navy torpedo boats and two Israel Air Force helicopters searched the area for survivors. At 1530 hours Israel reported the incident to the American Naval Attaché, Commander Ernest C. Castle, and at 1815 hours the attach, along with a representative of the IDF's Foreign Attaché Liaison Bureau took off for the ship to a Super Frelon helicopter to order to land the attaché on board and evacuate wounded, if necessary. Commander Castle attempted to signal the ship's crew by hand, and they answered with hand signals and lanterns; however, neither side understood the other. The helicopter pilot was ready to lower the attaché aboard the vessel by means of a cable, but the ship was unable to halt and the lowering could not be carried safely as long as the vessel was in motion. Finally, Commander Castle wrote the following message on his calling card: "Do you have any casualties ?", attached it to an orange and tossed it onto the ship. He was answered by signals from the "Liberty" which led him to understand that they had one wounded. But he was not certain of that. The helicopter hovered above the vessel for some thirty minutes, and, inasmuch as it was impossible to land or to lower the attaché on board, it returned to its base. The next day, 9 June, the search for survivors continued by means of a light aircraft. However, there were no results. The American Naval attaché verified details concerning rescue operations and requested that they continue the following day, since he believed that the current might carry survivors or bodies back towards shore. The search continued on 10 June, conducted by planes and torpedo boats. It lasted from 0500 hours until nightfall again without any results. The search was not renewed. Commander Castle thanked the IDF for its rescue efforts and did not request that they be resumed, since it was assumed that the bodies of the missing men rare trapped in those damaged compartments of the ship which had barn sealed after the torpedo attack. Exchange of Letters Concerning the Incident On 10 June the Israeli ambassador to Washington submitted a letter to the US State Department in which the Government of Israel expressed its regrets over the tragic incident and offered to pay compensation for the loss of life and damage to property. The American reply (which was received on the same day) stated that the "Liberty" had been attacked on the high seas, despite the fact that she flew an American flag and bore markings in accordance with the accepted practice, and that there was reason to assume that she had been identified as American. The American reply stated that the attack upon the "Liberty" was incomprehensible and should be regarded at the very least as a case military negligence and malicious disregard for human life. The American government expected that the Government of Israel would take the necessary disciplinary measures which an incident of such a nature warrants and issue appropriate instructions that would prevent the occurrence of similar incidents in the future. The reply also indicated that the American Government expected full compensation. The Israeli reply was submitted to the State Department on 12 June. In it Israel rejected the American accusations and stressed that such conclusions prior to the undertaking of a full investigation of the incident, were unjustified. The Israeli letter stated further that the Chief of Staff had appointed a Court of Inquiry and that its report would be forwarded to the United States Government. Israel's reply noted also its offer of assistance and the rescue operation which she had carried out. It also expressed her regret that information concerning the "Liberty 's" presence had not been brought to Israel's knowledge beforehand. The Israeli letter concluded with a repetition of Israel's offer to pay compensation. The Appointment of the Court of Inquiry On 12 June the Chief of Staff appointed Colonel Ram Ron as a one man Court of Inquiry, "In order to investigate the circumstances surrounding the attack carried out by IN farces on the American vessel the " Liberty ." The senior officer was entrusted with the responsibility for "establishing facts, drawing conclusions sod making recommendations."67 by the 15 June 1967. Colonel Ran Ron heard the testimony of twelve officers involved in the affair, and in the end of his investigation he established the facts relative to the incident. He concluded that the attack on the [page 28] vessel was not perpetrated "out of malice or criminal negligence but out of innocent error. The attack was perpetrated as a result of a chain of three errors each one of which individually, appeared to him, considering the circumstances, as a reasonable and innocent mistake."68 According to Colonel Ron* the following were the three errors:69 A) The erroneous report concerning the shelling of EL Arish. B) The establishment of the ship's speed at 30 knots, which removed all possible doubt as to the "Liberty" not being a hostile target. C) The Identification of the vessel as the "EL Quseir". Colonel Ron further concluded that he had no doubt as to the fact that the "Liberty" had attempted to conceal her identity and presence in the area.70 At the conclusion of his report, Colonel Run proffered recommendations as to procedures for declaring areas to be "Danger Zones" as well as additional recommendations regarding the training of pilots in the identification of enemy vessels, and staff procedures. The investigation file was forwarded to the Military Advocate General, Colonel Meir Shamgar for his opinion, which was submitted to the Chief of Staff on 20 June 1967. The Military Advocate General reviewed the facts established by the Court of Inquiry, most of which were accepted by him, and analyzed the implications of the investigations, The Military Advocate General's recommendations were as follows: "It is impossible, regarding this incident, to establish clearly at this stage whither anyone involved in the matter should be brought before a court martial ....I do not believe that there are grounds to complete the Court of Inquiry's investigation. However, given the Importance of the incident and the gravity of the results, it would be proper to entrust the investigation to a judicial institution i.e. examining judge."71 Letter of GOC Israel Navy On 17 June 1967, GOC Navy. R/Ad. Shlomo Erel sent a letter to his American opposite member, Admiral MacDonald. In his letter, the GOC expressed the Israel Navy's deep regrets concerning the terrible tragedy which had occured to the "Liberty" and requested that his condolences be transmitted to the families of the victims. He expressed his admiration of the ship's crew [page 29] for the manner in which they had overcome the damage and succeeded in saving their vessel. He expressed hope that future circumstances would enable seamen to carry out their work in peace and that such tragedies would not repeat themselves. The Appointment of an Examining Judge On 20 June 1967, in accordance with the powers granted him by the Code of Military Justice, the Military Advocate General instructed that a preliminary inquiry of the attack on the "Liberty" be carried out, inasmuch as in his opinion, an offense liable to require a court martial, had been committed.72 In accordance with the powers invested in him, and by the decision of the Military Advocate General, the President of the Military Appeals Court, Col. Yaakov Parry, on the same day, appointed Lt. Col. Yeshayahu Yerushalmi (a judge and professional purist) Examining Judge for the "Liberty" affair.73 The Military Advocate General had reason to believe that an offense had been committed, although at this stage no one had been indicted. He therefore ordered the holding of a preliminary investigation before an examining judge, to be conducted in the absence of an accused party.74 On 21 June 1967, the Chief Military Prosecutor, Major Yaakov Kedmi submitted a complaint to the Examing Judge without naming any defendant. The document specified seven points of negligence relevant to the actions of the various parties involved. On 25 June 1967 the first session of the preliminary inquiry was held. During its sessions, which lasted until 4 July 1967, the Examing Judge heard 34 witnesses for the prosecution (i.e., the Chief Military Prosecutor) and 14 exhibits were presented to him. When the hearing of the witnesses was completed the Chief Military Prosecutor presented a summation and requested to charge a number of naval officers with negligence in accordance with the written complaint. On 5 July 1967 the Examing -Judge read out an interim decision according to which the material presented before him permitted the attribution of negligence to Commander Lunz. He therefore summoned Commander Lunz to appear before him to cross-examine witnesses who had already appeared and to bring witnesses on his own behalf. For this purpose Command Lunz and his attorney were permitted access to the investigation file. The preliminary investigation was concluded on 18 July 1967, after three additional witnesses on behalf of commander Lunz had been heard, and a number of exhibits presented. On 21 July 1967 the Examining Judge read out his decision regarding the case. He specified the chain of events as depicted in the testimonies offered before him, and in light of these he analyzed the charges brought by the Chief Military Prosecutor in his complaint. The Examining Judge cited five factors which were responsible for creating the impression that the target was indeed an enemy vessel and should be attacked: A. The report concerning the shelling of EL-Arish for several hours in succession. B. The speed of the target which was tracked by the torpedo boats as 28-30 knots. C. The movement in the direction of Port Said. D. The report of the aircraft according to which the target was a military vessel which did not bear identifying naval markings or any other signs. E. The ship's position close to shore in a combat zone.75 In summation of his decision the judge stated: "Despite my regrets that our forces were involved in an incident with a naval craft of a friendly state and my regrets concerning the sad results of the incident, I must judge the conduct of each of the officers involved in any way with the affair, by the standard of conduct expected of reasonable officers at the time of military operations, when the Israel Navy was out-numbered by opposing naval forces and when foremost before the eyes of all those involved was the mission of protecting the security of the state, identifying every ill-intentioned enemy plotting against the state, and rapidly attacking and destroying him. The standard of reasonable behaviour under such conditions will perhaps differ from such a standard in time of peace. It may be possible for one who studies the compendious evidence presented before me to derive conclusions regarding the relations between the two I.D.F. services involved in the incident, the order of operations in a time of war, and especially the (relationship) between the various sections of the Navy. However such conclusions would transcend the scope of my investigation. I did not discover any deviation from the standard of reasonable behaviour which would justify bringing anyone to trial. Given the above, I hereby decide that there is insufficient prima facie evidence to justify bring any to trial." The decision of the examining judge was brought before the Military Advocate General who, after studying it, submitted his judicial opinion to the Chief of Staff on 24 July, 1967. In his decision the Military Advocate General analyzed the chain of events and the decision of the Examining Judge. HE weighted the possibilities available to him in accordance with the authority invested in him, and explained his decision "to accept the conclusions of the Examining-Judge and not to ask for an indictment." The Payment of Compensations Immediately following the incident, Israel indicated her willingness to pay compensation both to 'the families of the deceased and to the wounded (letter of 10 June, 1967). In June 1968 the Government of Israel paid compensation amounting to $3,323,000 to the families of the deceased, and in April, 1969, she paid $3,566,547 in the compensation to the wounded. In both cases Israel paid in full all claims issued against her. Her motivation was humanitarian.78 In respect to the claims for damages suffered by the vessel, Israel refused to meet the expenses for the repairs since "we did not consider ourselves responsible for the chain of errors."79 On 1 July, 1968 the Government of the United States of America filed claims totaling $7,644,116. This total was based upon an estimate of the sum needed to restore the vessel to operational capabilities (although vessels of this type had already been withdrawn from active service in the US Navy). On 5 August, 1968 Israel replied that she would not assume responsibility for the damages demanded. Due to American pressure this letter was withdrawn and in September, 1968, Israel likewise proposed that the US claims be withdrawn. On 26th July, 1971 Israel submitted another letter to the United States in which she offered to pay a token sum of $100 000. The Americans refused this offer. In the course of time the matter was forgotten until the Americans renewed their demands in the beginning of 1978. The Legal Advisor to the Government of the State of Israel appointed a small team to conduct negotiations with the claimant, and on 25 May 1978 the Americans were informed of the appointment of this team and of Israel 's willingness to open negotiations. In January 1980 the US Department of State announced its intention to propose in the near future a date for the start of negotiations.80 Contacts were renewed in December, 1980, during which it was agreed that Israel would pay compensation of $6 million to the US Navy for the damage inflicted on the ship. This compromise was reached with the agreement of President Jimmy Carter and it was agreed that the sum would be paid in three equal installments, beginning in January 1981. CHAPTER FIVE THE REVIVAL OF THE AFFAIR It might have been assumed that at the and of the various investigations into the "Liberty" incident, the affair would have been cleared up, it having been established that the ship was attacked by mistake. But from time to time the affair crops up anew, for it involves the mystery of a spy-ship, the drama of war, and the tragedy of the killed and wounded. The issue was revived first by the monthly "Penthouse". In June, 1978, there appeared an additional article in the monthly, U.S. Naval Proceedings. And in 1979 there appeared a book on the affair, written by an officer who was serving on the "Liberty" at the time of the incident. Two common denominators can be detected in these publications: A. The categorical assertion that the "Liberty" was maliciously attacked by Israel, with the intention of sinking her. B. Weighty reasons are given to explain why Israel acted as maliciously as she did. The story is woven around these two points, together with occasional flights of the imagination, missing facts, half-truths, or false conclusions. In all of the publications mentioned above, Israel's malicious intention is not based on any proven, factual description, but instead is stated as an immediate assertion, as a truth which the author's description is intended merely to reinforce - the strike against the "Liberty" was maliciously deliberate; it was not a question of a mistake, or a misunderstanding, nor even of negligence. Without entering into the details of each assertion, we may note several facts which in our opinion demolish the basis for any charge of malice. It is a fact that the air attack on the vessel was halted immediately at the moment of mistaken identity (when the letters were discovered on the ship's side). The same is true in regard to the halting of the torpedo attack. Immediately, the error was discovered, helicopters were dispatched to search for survivors and to aid in the evacuation of the wounded, and two tugs were dispatched from Ashdod to assist the vessel. These actions prove that Israel possessed no malicious intentions whatsoever. If the indeed had harbored such intentions, her Air and Naval Forces were clearly in a position to complete their mission and to sink the "Liberty" had they wished. As to the alleged motivation for Israel's actions against the "Liberty", various authors offer each his own set of motives. "Penthouse" suggests that the ""Liberty" was in possession of recordings which proved that Israel had tampered with the telephone conversations between Nasser and Hussein. Israel allegedly intercepted the conversations of the two leaders and transmitted to Hussein a doctored message which it concocted on the spot. All this in the course an ongoing conversation with neither of the two parties suspecting anything. According to the author, Israel prompted King Hussein to enter the war in force, and broadened the hostilities to include the Jordanian Kingdom. (Contrary to a prior agreement with the USA). The author contends that it was obviously necessary for Israel to destroy the evidence of her deed. We cannot treat this claim seriously. It would seem to be so absurd as to be self-defeating. The motives which US Naval institute Proceedings attributes to Israel's action ostensibly appear to be more logical: "A vital part of Israel 's war plans was preventing the rest of the world from knowing about its military victories until they could be presented together as a political fait accompli . . . The Israeli leaders feared superpower pressures for a cease-fire before they could seize the territory which they considered necessary for Israel 's future security. Any instrument which sought to penetrate this smokescreen so carefully thrown around the normal 'fog of war' would have to be frustrated."81 However this claim cannot withstand examination when one views the overall context of this event, and in order to refute it one does not even have to analyze the question of whether or not at the outbreak of the war Israel had predefined territorial objectives and a coherent philosophy of what constituted territory vital to her security.82 The "Liberty" incident occurred in the afternoon of 8 June 1967. At that time Israel had not yet decided to attack on the Syrian front. The contrary was in fact the case. It had been decided that Israel would not attack Syria at that stage. Given such circumstances, Israel had nothing to hide at the time of the attack on the "Liberty". Hostilities had already halted on the Jordanian front, and on the morning [page 35] of 8 June, Jordan officially announced her acceptance of the ceasefire. Israel's control over all of Judea Samaria was already known and had been publicized throughout the world. While it is true that on the Egyptian front fighting was still going on, it was clear that the outcome had already been determined and the dimensions of the Egyptian defeat and the Israeli victory were known. News of the destruction of the Arab Air Forces had been widely published throughout the world two days earlier. One may therefore ask what other military victories or faits accompli did Israel have to hide. Moreover, when the "Liberty" appeared of Israeli shores on the morning of 8 June, the ship's crew had already learned of all the above events via the mass media. Thus, even had the "Liberty" been sunk, such an act would not have suppressed news of Israel 's victory, and in any event there was no need to do so. Israel had maintained a certain "smokescreen" on 5 June 1967. However, the smoke was dissipated for all practical purposes, on Israel 's own initiative during the night of 5 6 June. No other "smokescreen" ever existed. Ennes' book attempts to present a more limited but better established motive for Israel's allegedly malicious intentions: "The Israeli Government was acutely aware of President Johnson's warning that he would support Israel only in self-defence, not in attacks against her neighbors. It was important, then for Israel to be seen as an innocent victim fighting to ward off hordes of wild-eyed Arabs. Not surprisingly, Israel claimed that nearly everything she did was in self-defence . . . now, with the war virtually over and the world crying for peace, could Israel put troops in Syria without being seen as an aggressor? Probably not. Not with the USS "Liberty" so close to shore and presumably listening. "Liberty" would have to go. ...General Elazar was forced to delay the invasion until "Liberty" was dispatched."83 The author claims that the Israeli attack on Syria had been scheduled initially for the morning of 8 June, and due to the " Liberty's" appearance was postponed for 24 hours. [page 36] One may question whether a military action against a hostile nation which had taken an active part in the war against Israel, and which had been attacking her territory and shelling her settlements for several consecutive days, could indeed be labeled an aggressive act. Would not self-defence have been more appropriate? It was assumed by Israel that the USA would not unequivocally oppose her action against Syria. On the contrary, Chief of Staff Rabin testifies: "I requested a check on the Americans' position and their possible reaction to a broad offensive against Syria. The matter was examined and our impression was that from the Americans there would be nothing to fear."84 The question remains as to the timing of the offensive on the Syrian front. In this context Ennes does present a number of correct facts. An Israeli offensive had in fact been planned for 8 June. This offensive was postponed and the "Liberty" did appear off the Israeli coast at that time. However, the relationship which the author infers between these facts and the "Liberty 's" elevation to a central position, as well as the author's ignorance of other facts, necessarily lead him to a false conclusion. The "Liberty" was not the main factor influencing Israel's deliberations, and her decision to postpone, and then finally to undertake the offensive against Syria was motivated by a completely different set of considerations. Throughout the entire day of 7 June operational plans for the offensive on the Syrian front were discussed at Supreme Command and at the Northern Command. In the evening G Branch-Operations issued a warning order for "Northern Hammer" (the offensive on the northern Golan). Battle procedure continued at the Northern Command, and H hour" was set at 081400. However, before midnight 7-8 June, the Minister of Defence informed the Chief of Staff that action on the Syrian Front would be permitted up to the international boundary only.85 The Chief of Staff opposed a limited operation, which would not be worthwhile and might be interpreted as a failure.86 The GOC Northern Command was of the same opinion. However, despite the Defence Minister's instructions, battle procedure continued in the Northern Command in the hope that perhaps after all the restrictions might be lifted. On the morning of 8 June. Israeli Air Force planes attacked the Syrian positions. However, these attacks were halted at approximately 1000 hours when the Minister of Defence repeated his instructions not to cross the international boundary. Throughout the day, Syrian artillery operated quite intensively, and Israeli artillery returned fire. The [page 37] Israeli Air Force was also brought into action in the afternoon hours to silence Syrian fire. The Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff discussed the question of the offensive on the Syrian front once again on the evening of 8 June. This was followed by deliberations between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff and eventually in the forum of the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs. It was decided that in the meantime Israel should not attack on the Syrian front, and it was decided further to "authorize the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to monitor developments, and if they should come to the conclusion that conditions were favorable, they might instruct the IDF to cross the border and operate against Syria.88 Only on 9 June at 0700 hours was the decision changed. The change was made when it became evident that Egypt intended to institute a ceasefire (and had advised Syria to do the same) when it appeared that the Russians had no intention of intervening and after reports regarding the flight of Syrians from the border region had been received. Only then did the Minister of Defence give the "green light" for the offensive on the Syrian front. The above clearly demonstrates that the "Liberty's" appearance off the coast of Israel had no bearing whatsoever upon the cancellation of the offensive on the Syrian front, since orders to that effect had been issued by the Minister of Defence the previous night when the "Liberty" was still far away from Israeli shores. In any event it is evident that the damage to the "Liberty", and her elimination from the arena played no role whatever in those considerations which affected Israel's decision to attack on the Syrian front. CONCLUSION An examination of the facts in the "Liberty" incident, in their proper context proves beyond any doubt that the attack on the American intelligence ship came about as a result of innocent error by the forces which operated on the spot and the HQs which supervised them. Through the attack on the armed forces of a friendly nation is most regrettable and painful occurrence, incidents of this kind do occur in war time. It goes without saying that such an incident must be thoroughly investigated, that all the causes of the tragic encounter must be examined, conclusions drawn, and proper instructions issued which will prevent the occurrence of such an incident in the future. From Israel's point of view all these steps have been carried out in a most thorough and comprehensive manner. However, it is inappropriate to attribute malicious intent to Israel, when the evidence does not bear out such an attribution. Nobody should dare to abuse the memory of American soldiers for sick political purposes, telling others about "cold-blooded murders". Cheers.
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#4
10-23-2006, 09:22 PM
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Judge..you again have witnessed Keith and DadAph's conduct
They have refused to address the doctored gun camera photos I can respond to all of those articles...but they'd run away from the contents of those articles also. The 13 Congressional investigations---alllll pro-Zionists on all forums have fled I'll take you to the USENET and we can see where Mike Weeks who is listed on p.xvi of the intro to the Liberty Incident flees from Cristol's words and all of these other issues Again, Judge...these guys are posting what they know to be lies. That is to stifle a free, unfettered debate The docotred Gun Camera photos...they refused to hyperlink you to where they have responded with any substance
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#5
10-23-2006, 09:31 PM
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I have no idea whether your photos are doctored. I am not an expert in photography. Maybe YOU doctored them to suit your position ? Hmmmm. You keep ignoring everything else--all the facts that don't fit your theories, and instead keep crying "but...what about the picthures... It's the picthures dagnabbit...Thufferin' thuccotash...it's those dirty Zionists." Weak. Very weak.
__________________
Seth: Gimme that. Alright, you look like a future pedophile in this picture, number 1. Number 2: it doesn't even have a first name, it just says "McLovin"! Evan: What? One name? ONE NAME!?!? Who are you? Seal? Seth: Fogell, this ID says that you're 25 years old. Why wouldn't you just put 21, man? Fogell: Seth, Seth, Seth. Listen up, ass-face: every day, hundreds of kids go into the liquor store with fake IDs, and every single one says they're 21. Pssh, how many 21 year olds do you think there are in this town? It's called f*cking strategy, alright?
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#6
10-23-2006, 09:34 PM
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#7
10-23-2006, 09:35 PM
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#8
10-23-2006, 09:37 PM
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#9
10-23-2006, 09:38 PM
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#10
10-23-2006, 09:48 PM
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one does not need to be a photographic expert to know that if one stands Orlando Pace in front of a Pepsi machine and takes a photo snapshot...
..that The Pepsi machine will not be visible unless Orlando was transparent, Judge The mast on the USS Liberty was not transpaerent,Judge. There should be a portion of the superstructure wheelhouse obscured These are Israel's photos..not mine. Ditto with the tugboat in the doctored Thames/ Cristol photo... That tension cable shows up on both photos.... A group of tugboats, aligned in battle formation, did not attack the USS Liberty. You do not need to be a photo expert to realize that. Keith knows you do not need to be a photo expert... ..so the very fact that he offered that canard... ...points to the long postings as being designed to hinder free, unfettered debate... ..as opposed to informing the CM readership
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#11
10-23-2006, 09:59 PM
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kahl will you stop posting about uss liberty if I say yuore right buddy?
chaging the minds of a few ...is that what you want? cmon man there are better platforms for this and it certainly isnt a gambling site lets beat the bookie buddy and quit this nonsense
__________________
The only bridge I've ever burned along this legacy I dance is the one that linked the cities of prosperity and chance Check out Technicapping for quantitative sport analysis
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#12
10-23-2006, 10:02 PM
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#13
10-23-2006, 10:03 PM
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#14
10-23-2006, 10:04 PM
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lol I didnt know judge already proposed that
__________________
The only bridge I've ever burned along this legacy I dance is the one that linked the cities of prosperity and chance Check out Technicapping for quantitative sport analysis
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#15
10-23-2006, 10:06 PM
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